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Beyond Band-Aids: A Proposal for Reconfiguring
Federal Sentencing After Booker
Frank0. Bowman, IIPt

The federal criminal sentencing system is changing. The Supreme Court ensured that much with its decisions in Apprendi v
New Jersey,' Blakely v Washington,2 and United States v
Booker.' The Court invalidated a critical procedural component
of the original mandatory Federal Sentencing Guidelines by
holding that juries, not judges, must find any fact that increases
a defendant's maximum guidelines exposure.4 The only question
is whether the guidelines system will change only a little, a lot,
or something in between. This Article lays out a proposal for
something in between.
The proposal advanced here rests on six premises. First, sentencing guidelines are a good idea and an improvement on systems that rely on unguided judicial sentencing discretion. Sect Floyd R. Gibson Missouri Endowed Professor of Law, University of MissouriColumbia School of Law. Many thanks to Steve Chanenson, Jim Felman, David Yellen,
and the members of the Sentencing Initiative of the Constitution Project for their helpful
comments on earlier drafts of this Article. Particular thanks to Don Stemen of the Vera
Institute of Justice for help in locating state budgetary data. Finally, I am grateful to the
staff of the University of Chicago Legal Forum for their invaluable work during the editing of this Article.
* This article is the second in a series of three articles about the federal
sentencing
system. The first piece in this series analyzed the failure of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines. Frank 0. Bowman, III, The Failureof the FederalSentencing Guidelines:A
StructuralAnalysis, 105 Colum L Rev 1315 (2005). The article that appears below proposes a new system to replace the failed Guidelines. The final piece in the series analyzes
the prospects for the enactment of this sentencing model, given the politics and political
science of the current federal sentencing system. Frank 0. Bowman, III, Mr. Madison
Meets a Time Machine: The PoliticalScience of FederalSentencing Reform, 58 Stan L
Rev (forthcoming 2005). Because this article builds on the analysis first advanced in The
Failure of the FederalSentencing Guidelines, the key components of that analysis are
reiterated, and sometimes expanded upon, here.
' 530 US 466 (2000).
2 124 S Ct 2531 (2004).
3 125 S Ct 738 (2005).
4 Id at 756 ("Accordingly, we reaffirm our holding in Apprendi Any fact (other than
a prior conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum
authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted
by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.").
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ond, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (the "Guidelines") have
failed of their promise because of flaws in their basic design.
Third, despite the Supreme Court's ruling in Booker, the Guidelines system could survive either virtually unchanged (if Congress removes or declares advisory the tops of the existing guideline ranges 5) or with relatively modest changes (if the courts interpret Booker to give the now-"advisory" guideline ranges presumptive status6 or if the Sentencing Commission were to
slightly simplify the Guidelines and subject aggravating Guidelines factors to proof by plea or jury trial'). Fourth, while each of
these modest legislative or judicial alterations to the original
Guidelines design has some immediate appeal as a response to
the systemic disruption caused by Blakely and Booker, all of
them are undesirable as permanent measures precisely because
they would reinstitute a fundamentally flawed regime that needs
a major redesign. Fifth, all of the other suggested permanent
replacements for the current Guidelines (such as voluntary or
purely advisory guidelines, a system of presumptive maximum
sentences, or increased use of hard mandatory minimum sentences) suffer from crippling flaws, either in design or political
viability. Sixth, and finally, what is required in a long-term replacement for the current federal guidelines is a system which:
(a) is consistent with the Supreme Court's new Sixth Amendment jury trial jurisprudence; (b) is workable by lawyers and
judges; (c) addresses the most fundamental design defects of the
current system, particularly those relating to institutional imbalances between sentencing actors; and (d) has some reasonable
prospect of political viability.
This Article proposes a simplified sentencing table consisting
of nine base sentencing ranges, each subdivided into three subranges. The base sentencing range would be determined by combining offense facts found by a jury or admitted in a plea with
the defendant's criminal history. A defendant's placement in the
sub-ranges would be determined by post-conviction judicial findings of sentencing factors. No upward departures from the base
sentencing range would be permissible, but defendants could be
sentenced below the low end of the base sentencing range as a
' See notes 202-05 and accompanying text (describing the "topless guidelines" proposal).
6 See notes 168-82 and accompanying text (describing the remedial portion of the
opinion in Booker).
7 See notes 165, 192-200 and accompanying text (describing the option of "Blakelyizing" the Guidelines).
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result of an acceptance of responsibility credit or due to a downward departure motion. Both the government and the defendant
would retain rights of appeal of post-conviction judicial findings
of fact and of misapplications of the law.
This revised sentencing guidelines system would increase
the role of the jury in setting federal criminal sentences while
retaining a role for post-conviction judicial fact-finding. It would
reduce the number of legally consequential decision points necessary for individual sentencings while incorporating the work
done by Congress and the Sentencing Commission over the past
several decades in identifying aggravating and mitigating factors
thought to be relevant to punishment. Most importantly, it would
promote a healthier institutional balance between Congress, the
Sentencing Commission, the judiciary, and the Department of
Justice.
The Article proceeds in five parts. Part I briefly describes the
history and operation of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Part
II explains why the Guidelines have failed. Part III discusses the
effect of the Supreme Court's recent Sixth Amendment jurisprudence on the constitutionality of the Guidelines. Part IV outlines
the reform options available in the wake of Blakely and Booker.
Part V describes my proposal and why it is preferable to other
possible options.
I. A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO THE FEDERAL SENTENCING
GUIDELINES

A. The Federal Sentencing Reform Movement
The current Guidelines-centered federal sentencing system
we now have that emerged from the Sentencing Reform Act of
1984 ("SRA")8 is both a rejection of certain prior practices and
understandings and an endorsement of a new set of objectives
and sentencing structures. Beginning in the late 1970s, reformers largely rejected the then-dominant rehabilitative or medical
model of sentencing as the central organizing and justifying
principle of criminal sentencing' (although rehabilitation re-

Pub L No 98-473, 98 Stat 1837 (1984).
' For more complete discussions of the fall of the rehabilitative model and the rise of
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, see Frank 0. Bowman, III, The Quality of Mercy
Must Be Restrained, and Other Lessons in Learning to Love the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 1996 Wis L Rev 679, 685-89; Pamala L. Griset, Determinate Sentencing. The
Promise and the Reality ofRetributive Justice at 11, 25-37 (SUNY 1991).
8
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mains a stated objective of the SRAI°). They were skeptical that
rehabilitation was possible," or at least that the existing criminal justice institutions knew how to rehabilitate any substantial
fraction of offenders.' 2 It seemed unclear that the judges and
probation officers operating at the front end of the criminal justice system had any special skill in prescribing the proper
amount and type of punishment most likely to rehabilitate offenders, or that the parole boards operating at the back end had
any demonstrable insight into when rehabilitation had been accomplished. Some reformers also sought "truth in sentencing"rules ensuring that defendants served all or a very substantial
portion of the sentence announced by the judge in the first place,
rather than the much lower sentence generally produced by the
exercise of the parole power. 3 Indeed, Justice Stephen Breyer,
who, while a circuit court judge was one of the original Sentencing Commissioners, has identified what he called "honesty in
sentencing" as one of Congress' two primary purposes in enacting

the SRA.' 4
The other congressional purpose, according to Justice
Breyer, was reducing unjustifiable sentencing disparities. 5 Federal sentencing reformers were concerned that the nearly unreviewable discretion afforded judges in the pre-Guidelines era
made sentencing a lawless process inasmuch as no law governed
a judge's choice of penalty. 6 Unreviewable judicial sentencing
10 18 USC § 3553(a)(2)(D) (2000) (stating that the sentencing judge "shall consider..
.the need for the sentence imposed... to provide the defendant with needed educational
or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective
manner").
" See Griset, Determinate Sentencing at 28-29 (cited in note 9) ("Penal treatment
was said to be empirically invalid, as measured by recidivism rates.").
12 See Steven S. Nemerson, Coercive Sentencing, 64 Minn L Rev 669, 685-86 (1980)
("In part, the massive professional and academic disillusionment with the therapeutic
model stems from the simple practical inability of the criminal justice system to reform
serious offenders effectively through incarceration."); Andrew von Hirsch, Recent Trends
in American Cnminal Sentencing Theory, 42 Md L Rev 6, 11 (1983) ("[N]o serious researcher has been able to claim that rehabilitation routinely could be made to work for
the bulk of the offenders coming before the courts.") (emphasis in original). See also Michael Vitiello, ReconsideringRehabiitation,65 Tulane L Rev 1011 (1991) (urging that
rehabilitation be revisited as a dominant rationale for criminal sanctions).
13 See, for example, Stephen Breyer, The FederalSentencing Guidelines and the Key
Compromises Upon Whi'ch They Rest, 17 Hofstra L Rev 1, 4 (1988) ("[The parole] system
sometimes fooled the judges, sometimes disappointed the offender, and often misled the
public.").
14

Id.

15

Id ("Congress' second purpose was to reduce 'unjustifiably wide' sentencing dispar-

ity.").
16 One of the first and most influential critics of pre-guidelines sentencing on the
ground of unjustifiable sentence disparity was Judge Marvin E. Frankel. He said of the
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discretion was thought to produce unjustifiable sentencing disparities and undeniably made the sentencing process opaque.1 7
The second point is of almost equal importance to the first; that
is, since under the former system judges had no obligation to explain their sentences, it was impossible to determine whether
and to what degree sentencing outcomes were unjustifiably disparate.1 " Liberal critics of the old regime were particularly concerned that a system of lawless, unreviewable judicial discretion
might be hospitable to hidden racial disparities. 9
There was also concern in some quarters that sentences for
some classes of federal offenders were unduly lenient, ° and that
judges and prosecutors were colluding, through the practice of
plea bargaining, to produce inappropriately low sentences in individual cases. 2 Many of those expressing these concerns believed that the objective of improved crime control could be
achieved through the imposition of more and longer sentences of
incarceration, providing lengthier periods of incapacitation and,
assertedly, greater deterrence.2 2
The collapse of the rehabilitative model and a fortuitous
alignment of political forces from the congressional right and left
indeterminate sentencing system in the federal courts that "the almost wholly unchecked
and sweeping powers we give to judges in the fashioning of sentences are terrifying and
intolerable for a society that professes devotion to the rule of law." Marvin E. Frankel,
Criminal Sentences. Law Without Order 5 (Hill & Wang 1973). See also Marvin E.
Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U Cin L Rev 1, 1 (1972) ("[Sentencing] is by and
large a bizarre 'nonsystem' of extravagant powers confided to variable and essentially
unregulated judges, keepers and parole officials."); The President's Commission on Law
Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Task Force Report: The Courts 23 (GPO
1967) (finding sentencing disparity to be pervasive); National Advisory Commission on
Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, Corrections 142-43 (GPO 1973) (same); Peter B.
Hoffman and Barbara Stone-Meierhoefer, Application of Guidelines to Sentencing,3 L &
Psych Rev 53, 53-56 (1977) (describing criticisms of then-extant sentencing practices on
the ground of "unwarranted sentencing disparity"). Peter Hoffman later became the principal draftsman of the Guidelines.
'" See Frankel, CriminalSentences at 39-45 (cited in note 16) (discussing the effects
of unreviewable sentencing decisions).
18 Id.
'9 See William W. Wilkins, Jr., Phyllis J. Newton, and John R. Steer, The Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984: A Bold Approach to the UnwarrantedSentencingDisparityProblem,
2 Crim L F 355, 359-62 (1991) (discussing the public perception of biased sentences and
reviewing empirical studies on the disparate treatment of minority defendants and victims).
20 See Kate Stith and Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of SentencingReform: The Legislative History of the FederalSentencing Guidelines, 28 Wake Forest L Rev 223, 278 (1993)
(describing Congressional distrust of judges and prosecutors).
21 Id.
2 See Barbara S. Barrett, Sentencing Guidelines:Recommendations for Sentencing
Reform, 57 Mo L Rev 1077, 1079 (noting that during the 1970s "the perception that crime
rates were out of control led some officials to demand surer and stiffer sanctions against
criminals as a means of preventing crime").
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produced the SRA and three years later, in 1987, the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines.2 3 The Guidelines were written, and continue to be studied and amended, by the United States Sentencing Commission. The Sentencing Commission is an "independent
commission in the judicial branch of the United States," whose
members are nominated by the President and confirmed by the
Senate.2 4 It consists of seven voting members, no more than four
of whom may be members of the same political party.2" The law
originally required that at least three commissioners be federal
judges,2 6 but, in 2003 the so-called PROTECT Act restricted the
number of judges on the Commission to no more than three.27
The Attorney General, or his designee, has since the inception of
the Commission been an ex officio and non-voting member.2 8
Congress created the Sentencing Commission for three basic
reasons. First, substantive federal criminal law was a ghastly
mess, with hundreds of overlapping and often oddly-drafted provisions and no system for classifying the relative seriousness of
offenses.2 9 Congress tried and repeatedly failed throughout the
1970s to bring order to this chaos by writing a rationalized federal criminal code." Fresh from this frustration, the legislators
recognized that a body of experts was needed to draft reasonable
sentencing rules.3 '
Second, Congress realized that the first set of rules would
certainly be imperfect and would require monitoring, study, and
modification over time.32 A body of experts was required as well.33

"

Probably the best historical description of the genesis of the SRA and the Guidelines is Stith and Koh, 28 Wake Forest L Rev 223 (cited in note 20).
28 USC § 991(a) (1993 & Supp 2004).
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Prosecutorial Remedies and Tools Against the Exploitation of Children Today Act
of 2003 (PROTECT Act), Pub L No 108-21, 117 Stat 650 § 401(n)(1) (amending 28 USC §
991(a) (1984)).
' 28 USC § 991(a).
2 For example, Appendix A to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual lists more
than 1,000 separate federal statutory crimes subject to guidelines sentencing. United
States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual,App A (2004).
" See Ronald L. Gainer, Federal CriminalCode Reform: Past and Future, 2 Buff
Crim L Rev 45, 92-135 (1998) (reviewing historical efforts to revise the federal criminal
code).
3' Mistretta v United States, 488 US 361, 379 (1989) ("Developing proportionate
penalties for hundreds of different crimes by a virtually limitless array of offenders is
precisely the sort of intricate, labor-intensive task for which delegation to an expert body
is especially appropriate.").
32 Breyer, 17 Hofstra L Rev at 7-8 (cited in note 13) ("[T]he Commission remained
aware throughout the drafting process that Congress intended it to be a permanent body
that would continuously revise the Guidelines over the years. Thus, the system is 'evolutionary'-the Commission issues Guidelines, gathers data from actual practice, analyses

149]

RECONFIGURINGFEDERAL SENTENCING

155

Third, Congress concluded that making sentencing rules required not only expertise, but insulation from the distorting
pressures of politics.3 4 Thus, the Sentencing Commission was
situated outside both of the political branches of government,
and even made independent of the normal chain of command in
the judicial branch in which it formally resides.3 5 The Commission's anomalous independent status was one of the primary
grounds for challenges to the Guidelines' legality, but the Supreme Court held that the Commission and the Guidelines were
constitutional."
B.

A Primer on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines

The Federal Sentencing Guidelines 7 are, in a sense, simply
a long set of instructions for one chart-the Sentencing Table.3"
The goal of Guidelines' calculations is to arrive at numbers for
the vertical ("offense level") and horizontal ("criminal history
category") axes on the Sentencing Table grid, which in turn generate an intersection in the body of the grid. Each such intersection designates a "sentencing range" expressed in months.39 Ordinarily, the bottom of the range will be above the statutory
minimum sentence prescribed for the offense or offenses of conviction and the top of the range will be below the statutory
maximum sentence prescribed for the offense or offenses of conviction.4 ° Statutory minima and maxima trump the Guidelines. 4 '
the data, and revises the Guidelines over time.").
3 28 USC § 994(o) (1993) (establishing that the Commission shall periodically review
and revise the Guidelines, and consult with experts and institutional representatives
regarding these revisions).
34 28 USC § 991(a) establishes that no more than four Commission members may
belong to the same political party, and that members are subject to removal from office
only for good cause. See also Mistretta,488 US at 408-11 (discussing the Sentencing
Commission's independence and the President's limited power of removal).
35 See Mistretta, 488 US at 393 (noting that the Sentencing Commission "is not a
court, does not exercise judicial power, and is not controlled by or accountable to members
of the Judicial Branch."). In dissent, Justice Scalia argued that the Commission's lawmaking power combined with the lack of control over it by any official of the judicial
branch rendered the Commission an unconstitutional body. Id at 422-27.
Id at 412.
37 United States Sentencing Commission, GuidelinesManual(2004)("USSG").
36

a USSG Ch 5, Pt A (1996).
'9 Id. By statute, the top end of the range can be no more than 25 percent higher than
the bottom end. 28 USC § 994(b)(2) (1993); USSG Ch 1, Pt A (2) (1996 & Supp 2004). For
a discussion of the "25 percent rule," see Bowman, 1996 Wis L Rev at 691 n 49, 712-13
(cited in note 9).
40 The terms "statutory minimum sentence" and "statutory maximum sentence" are
used here in the pre-Biakely sense of the minimum or maximum sentence to which a
defendant is exposed by statute as a result of a conviction by plea or trial.
41 USSG § 5G1.1 (1996). For example, a defendant subject to a 60-month statutory
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The "criminal history category" reflected on the horizontal
axis of the Sentencing Table is a rough effort to quantify the defendant's disposition to criminality, as reflected in the number
and nature of his prior contacts with the criminal law.42 The "offense level" reflected on the vertical axis of the Sentencing Table
is a measurement of the seriousness of the present crime. The
offense level customarily has three components: (1) a "base offense level," (2) a set of "specific offense characteristics," and (3)
additional adjustments under Chapter Three of the Guidelines.4 3
The base offense level is a seriousness ranking based purely on
the fact of conviction of a particular statutory violation. For example, most fraud convictions now carry a base offense level of
7. The "specific offense characteristics" are an effort to categorize and account for commonly occurring factors that cause us to
think of one crime as worse than another, and thus they "customize" the crime."
Most American state sentencing guidelines systems use
some form of sentencing grid or table similar to the federal
model, insofar as they employ measurements of offense seriousness and criminal history to place defendants within a sentencing range.4 6 The federal system, however, is unique in the complexity of its Sentencing Table, which has forty-three levels on its
vertical axis and six levels on its horizontal axis.4 v Consequently,
minimum sentence whose guideline range is 57-71 months must be sentenced to no less
than 60 months, while a defendant convicted of only one count of a crime with a statutory
maximum sentence of 60 months cannot be sentenced to more than 60 months even if his
guideline range is 57-71 months.
42 See USSG Ch 4 (2004) for the rules regarding the calculation of criminal history
category. The basic unit of measurement in this calculation is prior sentences imposed for
misdemeanors and felonies.
43 USSG § 1B1 (2004).
" USSG § 2B1.1(a)(1) (2004).
4' For instance, the Guidelines differentiate between a mail fraud in which the victim
loses $1,000 and a fraud with a loss of $1,000,000. A loss of $1,000 would produce no
increase in the base offense level for fraud of 6, while a loss of $1,000,000 would add sixteen levels and thus increase the offense level from 6 to 22.The amount of the "loss" is not
the only specific offense characteristic for fraud offenses. Section 2Bl.1 also provides
adjustments for the specific offense characteristic of the use of "sophisticated means" to
commit the fraud, USSG § 2B1.1(b)(8)(C) (2004), jeopardizing the soundness of a financial
institution, USSG § 2BI.1(b)(12)(B) (2004), and many other factors.
" See Richard S. Frase, State Sentencing Guidelines: Still Going Strong, 78 Judicature 173, 176 (1995) ("Most states have promulgated guidelines in the form of a twodimensional grid, but a few employ narrative rules for each offense or offense group.");
Richard S. Frase, Is Guided Discretion Sufficient? Overview of State Sentencing Guidelines, 44 SLU L J 425, 427 (2000) (noting that among states that have sentencing guidelines, Delaware, Florida, and Ohio do not use sentencing "grids," but "their 'narrative' or
'point-system' guidelines could be translated into a grid").
47 USSG Ch 5, Pt A (1996).
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a federal defendant can be placed in any one of 258 possible sentencing range boxes.
The large number of Guideline offense levels stems from two
causes. First, one of Congress's primary aims in passing the SRA
was to restrict judicial sentencing discretion. The architects of
the SRA understood the obvious point that a guidelines system
with very wide sentencing ranges would impose little restraint
on judicial discretion. To prevent the Sentencing Commission
from conferring too much discretion on judges, the drafters of the
SRA included a provision known among federal sentencing practitioners as the "25 percent rule."' The "25 percent rule" requires
that the top of a guideline sentencing range can be no more than
the greater of six months or 25 percent higher than the bottom of
the range.4 9 Given this statutory constraint, the Sentencing
Commission could not have constructed a sentencing table with
any fewer than eighteen offense levels on its vertical axis.5 ° And
if the Guidelines were to accord reasonable significance to criminal history, six criminal history categories were probably at or
close to the desirable minimum number the Commission could
have adopted. Thus, given statutory constraints, the Commission
could not have constructed a sentencing grid much simpler than
18 by 6, with 108 sentencing ranges.
The fact that the Commission adopted a Sentencing Table
with 43 offense levels rather than 18, and 258 sentencing ranges
rather than 108, was a result, not of statutory necessity, but of
several decisions by the Commission itself. The most important
of these was the Commission's conclusion that offender culpabil48

28 USC § 994(b)(2) (1993).

4 The "25 percent rule" provides:
If a sentence specified by the guidelines includes a term of imprisonment, the
maximum of the range established for such a term shall not exceed the minimum of
that range by more than the greater of 25 percent or 6 months, except that, if the
minimum term of the range is 30 years or more, the maximum may be life imprisonment.
Id.
,o At least it could not have done so if the table was to provide continuous coverage
from zero months to 30 years-to-life and provide for sentences of 30 or more years for first
offenses such as murder, highjacking, and the like. To see why eighteen levels is the
mathematical minimum, start with an Offense Level 1 with a sentencing range of 0-6
months, then add offense levels with the maximum possible sentencing range until you
reach a range with a minimum sentence of 360 months (30 years) or more. The result is
that Levels 1 through 5 have six-month sentencing ranges (0-6 months, 6-12 months,
and so on), then, beginning at Level 6, the top of the range is increased by 25 percent over
the top of the next lower range (30-37 months, 37-46 months, and so on), until thirty
years is reached. At least eighteen offense levels are required to cover the entire range.
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ity could be measured in fairly small, discrete increments.5 Examples of this approach include the drug quantity table of the
53
drug guideline,52 the loss table of the economic crime guideline,
and the robbery guideline, which identifies five different levels of
enhancement for possession or use of a weapon and five levels of
enhancements for different degrees of bodily harm to a victim.5 4
In addition, the Commission wanted to create overlapping sentencing ranges so that the high end of each sentencing range was
at roughly the midpoint of the range above it. The idea was to
diminish the impact of one-level differences in Guideline calculaso reduce the likelihood of litigation over these differtions and
55
ences.
Chapter Three of the Guidelines provides for additional adjustments to the offense level. These include increases in the offense level based on factors such as the defendant's role in the
offense, 6 whether the defendant engaged in obstruction of justice 57 commission of an offense against a government official58 or
particularly vulnerable victim,59 and the existence of multiple
counts of conviction.6 ° There are also possible reductions in offense level based on a defendant's "mitigating role" in the offense 6 or on so-called "acceptance of responsibility."6 2
51 Peter B. Hoffman, Simplifying the US Sentencing Commission's Offense Scale, 44
SLU L J 365, 365-66 (2000).
52 USSG § 2D1.1(c) (2004) (assigning offense level increases based on drug amount in
two-level increments from 6 to 38).
53 USSG § 2B1.1(b) (2004). The current economic crime guideline contains a loss
table with fifteen two-offense-level enhancements. This actually represents a simplification of the previous loss table, which contained eighteen one-offense-level enhancements.
USSG § 2F.A(b) (1989).
USSG § 2B3.1(b)(2) and (b)(3) (2004).
5 USSG § 1A1.1 n 4(h) (1998).
5 USSG § 3B1.1 (2004). The defendant's offense level can be enhanced by either 2, 3,
or 4 levels depending on the degree of control he exercised over the criminal enterprise
and on the size of that enterprise.
57 USSG § 3C1.1 (2004). Obstruction of justice includes conduct such as threatening
witnesses, suborning perjury, producing false exculpatory documents, destroying evidence, and failing to appear as ordered for trial. See also, USSG § 3C1.1, cmt 3 (2004).
USSG § 3A1.2 (2004).
59 USSG § 3A1.1 (2004) (creating an enhancement when a victim was selected based
on "race, color, religion, national origin, ethnicity, gender, disability, or sexual orientation" and in the case of a victim "unusually vulnerable due to age, physical or mental
condition").
60 USSG Ch 3, Pt D (2004).
61 USSG § 3B1.2 (2004) (allowing decreases in offense level of 2 or 4 levels if defendant is found to be a "minor participant" or "minimal participant" in the criminal activity).
62 USSG § 3E1.1 (2004) (allowing reduction of 2 offense levels where defendant
"clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility," and 3 offense levels if otherwise applicable offense level is a least 16 and defendant has "assisted authorities in the investigation or prosecution of his own misconduct" by taking certain steps). Despite the euphe-
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A unique and controversial aspect of the Guidelines is "relevant conduct."6 3 The Guidelines require that a judge calculating
the applicable offense level and any Chapter Three adjustments
must consider not only a defendant's conduct directly related to
the offense or offenses for which he was convicted, but also the
foreseeable conduct of his criminal partners,' as well as his own
uncharged, dismissed, or sometimes even acquitted conduct6 5
that was part of the same transaction, common scheme, or plan
as the offense of conviction. 6 The primary purpose of the relevant conduct provision is to prevent the parties (and to a lesser
degree the court itself) from circumventing the Guidelines
through charge bargaining or manipulation.
Just as a characteristic feature of pre-Guidelines sentencing
was the nearly unfettered authority of the judge to set the initial
sentence, the defining characteristic of the pre-Booker Guidelines regime is its systematic restraint of district court sentencing discretion. Once a district court has determined the final offense level on the vertical axis and the criminal history category
on the horizontal axis, the Sentencing Table designates the sentencing range. The judge retains effectively unfettered discretion
68 However, by design,
to sentence within that range.
the SRA
and the Sentencing Guidelines make it very difficult to "depart"--that is, to impose a sentence above or below the designated sentencing range. In order to depart, the judge must justify the departure, on the record, by reference to factors specified
in the Guidelines as appropriate grounds for departure,69 or by
finding "that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into considmism "acceptance of responsibility," § 3E 1.1 is nothing more nor less than an institutionalized incentive for guilty pleas.
6 USSG § 1B1.3 (2004). For a thorough discussion of the relevant conduct concept
see Roger W. Haines, Jr., Frank 0. Bowman, III, and Jennifer C. Woll, FederalSentencing GuidelinesHandbook 143-58 (West 2004).
64 USSG § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) (2004).
' A judge may consider acquitted conduct if the government proves its occurrence at
sentencing by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v Watts, 519 US 148, 157
(1997) (holding that the sentencing court was not barred from considering acquitted conduct by the jury's verdict because the burden of proof at sentencing is a preponderance of
the evidence, rather than the trial standard of beyond a reasonable doubt).
6
USSG § 1B1.3(a)(2) (2004).
67 See William W. Wilkins, Jr. and John R. Steer, Relevant Conduct.: The Cornerstone of the FederalSentencing Guidelines, 41 SC L Rev 495, 499-500 (1990) (discussing
how the relevant conduct provision limits the parties' powers to shape the Guideline
sentencing range through bargaining). For further discussion of the use of charge bargaining to circumvent Guidelines rules, see notes 159-61 and accompanying text.
8 USSG § 5C1.1(A) (2004).
6 See USSG Ch 5, Pt K (2004).
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eration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that described."" Moreover, except in unusual circumstances, the
Guidelines specifically exclude from consideration for purposes of
departing outside the Guidelines range most of those factors,
such as age, employment record, or family ties, which judges
formerly used to "individualize" sentences.7 ' Critically, all of
these limitations on the discretion of the sentencing judge are
made enforceable by a right of appeal given to both parties.72
Finally, the SRA eliminated parole and with it the discretionary authority of correctional officials and the Parole Commission to shorten the nominal sentence announced by the judge in
court.7" The SRA decrees that, absent very unusual circumstances, a defendant must serve at least 85 percent of his announced sentence, with only a 15 percent reduction possible for
good behavior in prison.74 Before the Guidelines, offenders generally served 40 to 70 percent of their stated prison term, depending in part on the length of the term originally imposed.75
II.

THE FAILURE OF THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES
SYSTEM

For most of the last decade, I supported the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and wrote extensively in their defense,76 while
70 This language appears in the Guidelines' enabling legislation, 18 USC § 3553(b)
(2004), and is repeated in the Guidelines themselves, USSG § 5K2.0 (2004).
71 Chapter 5, Part H of the Guidelines lists factors the Commission determined to be
"not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a sentence should be outside the applicable guideline range." USSG Ch 5, Pt H. These include age, § 5H1.1; educational and vocational skills, § 5H1.2; mental and emotional conditions, § 5H1.3; physical condition, §
5H1.4; history of substance abuse, § 5H1.4; employment record, § 5H1.5; family or community ties, § 5H1.6; socio-economic status, § 5H1.10; military record, § 5H1.11; history
of charitable good works, § 5H1.11; and "lack of guidance as a youth," § 5H1.12. In theory,
most of these factors nonetheless can justify a departure, but pre-Booker, such a departure was permissible only where the excluded factor was present to a degree so unusual
that the Commission would not have anticipated its impact and thus did not "adequately
[take it] into consideration" when formulating the Guidelines. 18 USC § 3553(b) (2004).
72 18 USC § 3742 (2004).
71 Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub L No 98-473, 98 Stat 2027 (1984).
74 18 USC § 3624(b) (2004) (allowing a good behavior sentence reduction of up to 54
days at the end of each year of the prisoner's sentence, beginning at the end of the first
year of the term).
71 Paul J. Hofer and Courtney Semisch, Examning Changes in Federal Sentence
Severity: 1980-1998, 12 Fed Sent Rptr 12, 13 (1999).
71 See Bowman, 1996 Wis L Rev at 680 (cited in note 9) ("[The Guidelines] are, at
worst, a marked improvement over the system they replaced and are, on balance, a notable, albeit certainly imperfect, success."); Frank 0. Bowman, III, Fearof Law: Thoughts
on Fearof Judgingand the State of the FederalSentencing Guidelines, 44 SLU L J 299,
300 (2000) ("At worst, the Guidelines are a predictably flawed work-in-progress and a
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chronicling their defects." In the past year, I have reluctantly
concluded that the federal sentencing system centered on the
Guidelines has failed because it too often produces bad outcomes
in individual cases and sometimes in whole classes of cases, but
more importantly because the basic structure of the system has
evolved in a way that makes self-correction virtually impossible.
This conclusion has not been altered by the Supreme Court's
Booker decision rendering the Guidelines "advisory." I have laid
out a detailed analysis of the Guidelines' failure elsewhere,78 and
so will give only a synopsis of that analysis here.
A.

The Successes (or Near-Successes) of the SRA and the
Guidelines

The current federal sentencing system is by no means without its accomplishments. In many important respects it fulfills
the objectives of its framers.
First, the SRA set out to, and did, abandon the rehabilitative
or medical model of punishment as the primary organizing principle of federal sentencing. Instead, the SRA and the Guidelines
are actuated by something like Norval Morris's idea of "limiting
retributivism," v even if they are not a perfect fulfillment of that
idea.8 ° Moreover, while the current system gives more prominence to the ideas of just deserts as a limiting principle and
crime control as a utilitarian objective than had previously been

notable improvement over the system they replaced."); Frank 0. Bowman, III, Departing
Is Such Sweet Sorrow: A Year of JudicialRevolt on "SubstantialAssistance" Departures
Follows a Decade ofProsecutorialIn&scipline, 29 Stetson L Rev 7, 42-63 (1999) (responding to common criticisms of the Guidelines' substantial assistance departure mechanisms,
while criticizing Department of Justice practice regarding such departures).
7' Bowman, 1996 Wis L Rev at 740-45 (cited in note 9) (criticizing the length of federal drug sentences under the Guidelines).
7' Frank 0. Bowman, III, The Failureof the FederalSentencing Guidelines:A StructuralAnalysis,105 Colum L Rev 1315 (2005).
" See Norval Morris, Madness and the Criminal Law 179-208 (Chicago 1982) (noting
that the term "limiting retributivism" describes a theory of justification for criminal punishment which holds that "just deserts is an appropriate general justifying aim of punishment, but that it sets fairly broad bounds within which a range of not-unjust punishments may be chosen according to other principles, both utilitarian and nonutilitarian.").
See also Marc Miller, Purposes at Sentencing,66 S Cal L Rev 413, 432 (1992) (discussing
Congressional intent and Morris' just deserts theory).
o See Paul J. Hofer and Mark Allenbaugh, The Reason Behind the Rules: Finding
and Using the Philosophy of the FederalSentencing Guidelines, 40 Am Crim L Rev 19
(2003); Bowman, 44 SLU L J at 316 (cited in note 76) (describing the Guidelines as being
guided by the moral imperative of proportionality and two "pragmatic generalizations
about human behavior").
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the case, it does not explicitly abandon the goal of rehabilitation.
Second, the SRA accomplished its goal of achieving "truth in
sentencing." Parole is abolished and the law now requires that
federal defendants sentenced to a term of incarceration serve 85
percent of the period imposed by the court before becoming eligible for release. 2
Third, the SRA addressed the problem of unwarranted disparity by mandating the creation of sentencing guidelines and a
commission to write, study, and amend them. The available evidence suggests that the Guidelines have succeeded in reducing
judge-to-judge disparity within judicial districts. 3 On the other
hand, researchers have found significant disparities between
sentences imposed on similarly situated defendants in different
districts and different regions of the country,84 and interdistrict
disparities appear to have grown larger in the Guidelines era,
particularly in drug cases.8 5 Moreover, there is reason to be concerned that developments such as the legitimation of "fast-track"
programs under the PROTECT Act will increase interdistrict
disparity by giving the Justice Department discretion to create
geographic zones in which special sentencing rules are adopted
"' 18 USC § 3553(a)(2)(D) (2000) (stating that the sentencing judge "shall consider..
* the need for the sentence imposed... to provide the defendant with needed educational
or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective
manner").
82 See note 75.
8 See Paul J. Hofer, Kevin R. Blackwell, and R. Barry Ruback, The Effect of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines on Inter-Judge Sentencing Disparity, 90 J Crim L &
Criminol 239, 241 (1999) ("[T]he guidelines have significantly reduced overall inter-judge
disparity in sentences imposed"); James M. Anderson, Jeffrey R. Kling, and Kate Stith,
Measuring Interjudge Sentencing Disparity: Before and After the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 42 J L & Econ 271, 273 (1999) (finding a decrease in sentencing disparity
between randomly selected judges during the early years of the guidelines).
' See Hofer, Blackwell, and Ruback, 90 J Crim L & Criminol at 241 (cited in note
83); Jeffrey T. Ulmer, John H. Kramer, and Brian Johnson, DistrictMatters:An Analysis
of Inter-District Variation in FederalSentencing, Presented at the American Society of
Criminology (2001); United States Sentencing Commission, Fifteen Years of Guideline
Sentencing-An Assessment of How Well the FederalCriminalJustice System Is Achieving the Goals of Sentencing Reform 94, available at <https://www.ussc.gov/15_year/
chap3.pdf> (last visited May 26, 2005) ("The results of the latest analyses indicate that
the guidelines have significantly reduced inter-judge disparity compared to the preguidelines era.... The available evidence suggests that regional disparity remains under the
guidelines, and some evidence suggests it may have even increased among drug trafficking offenses."). See also Frank 0. Bowman, III and Michael Heise, Quiet Rebellion II: An
EmpiricalAnalysis ofDecliningFederalDrug Sentences IncludingData from the District
Level, 87 Iowa L Rev 477, 530-34 (2002) (discussing the wide variation in average drug
sentences between federal circuits).
' See Hofer, Blackwell, and Ruback, 90 J Crim L & Criminol at 241 (cited in note

149]

RECONFIGURINGFEDERAL SENTENCING

163

to facilitate case management concerns of prosecutors and
courts. 6
There is ongoing dispute about the effect of the Guidelines
on racial disparity. African-American and Hispanic defendants
are significantly over-represented in the federal prison population in comparison with their percentage in the general population. For example, in 2001, 41 percent of all defendants sentenced under the Guidelines were Hispanic, while 24.6 percent
were African-American. 7 The difficult question is determining
whether this over-representation is simply a consequence of the
distribution of federally prosecutable criminal behavior among
racial and ethnic groups, or whether it results wholly or in part
from racial discrimination in the enforcement of federal criminal
law, or in the design and operation of federal sentencing rules.
Fourth, the SRA and the Guidelines brought law and due
process to federal sentencing. Not all forms of guidelines accomplish this end. Some states have voluntary guidelines systems in
which judges need not apply the rules at all.8" Other states have
guidelines systems that are advisory in the sense that judges are
required to perform guidelines calculations, but are not required
to sentence in conformity with what the guidelines suggest
should be the result of those calculations.8 9 In neither voluntary
' "Fast-track" programs are created to speed processing in high-volume or in highvolume districts by offering extraordinary sentencing discounts in return for early pleas.
See Robert Howell, SentencingReform Lessons: From the SentencingReform Act of 1984
to the Feeney Amendment, 94 J Crim L & Criminol 1069, 1079-80 (2004). They require
an initiative by the prosecution to create the program and make the plea offers, and the
cooperation of judges in accepting the resulting pleas. Such programs were formerly not
sanctioned by the Guidelines and were a source of friction between local United States
Attorney's Offices and Justice Department. The PROTECT Act confers power on the
Attorney General to authorize such programs and mandates a special guidelines provision for them. PROTECTAct § 401(m)(2)(B), 117 Stat at 675. See Attorney General John
Ashcroft, Memo RegardingPolicy On Charging Of Criminal Defendants (Sept 22, 2003),
available at <http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2003/September/03-ag-516.htm> (last visited
Apr 7, 2005) (describing circumstances under which the Attorney General will authorize
the creation of local fast-track programs). In response to this mandate, the Sentencing
Commission created an "early disposition" departure. USSG § 5K3.1 (2004). For a discussion of fast-track programs in a number of Mexican border districts, see Hearing of
United States Sentencing Commission, Implementing Requirements of the PROTECT
Act, Testimony ofFrank 0 Bowman, III to U.S. Sentencing Commission, (Sept 23, 2003),
at 117-119, available at <http://www.ussc.gov/hearings/9_-23_03/092303PH.pdf> (last
visited Apr 7, 2005).
17 United States Sentencing Commission, 2002 Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing
Statisticsat 14, Table 4 (2003).
85 See, for example, Va Code Ann § 17.1-803 (1950 & Supp 2004) (creating a sentencing commission with the power to develop, maintain, and modify a system of discretionary sentencing guidelines).
89 Ark Stat § 16-90-801 et seq (1987 & Supp 2003) (establishing a sentencing commission and advisory sentencing guidelines or standards). See also Frase, 44 SLU L J at
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nor advisory guidelines systems is the judge's sentencing decision subject to meaningful appellate review. To say that the
Guidelines brought "law" to federal sentencing is to say: (1) that
sentencing judges must find facts and apply the Guidelines' rules
to those findings; and (2) that the Guidelines are legally binding
and enforceable through a process of appellate review.
In theory, bringing law to sentencing makes sentencing outcomes more predictable and gives the parties a fair opportunity
to present and dispute evidence bearing on legally-relevant sentencing factors. Likewise, bringing law to sentencing promotes
transparency. That is, one can now ascertain from the record
many, if not all, of the factors which were dispositive in generating the final sentence.
B.

The Failures of the Guidelines System

Despite its real successes, the federal sentencing regime has
only partially achieved the laudable objectives of the SRA and
suffers from serious substantive defects calling for significant
reform.
1.

Severity.

At or near the root of virtually every serious criticism of the
Guidelines is the concern that they are too harsh-that federal
law requires the imposition of prison sentences too often and for
terms that are too long. It is notoriously difficult to determine
how much punishment is enough, either in individual cases or
across an entire population of offenders, but one can say three
things with assurance. First, the current federal sentencing regime has dramatically increased federal inmate populations and
the length of the sentences federal inmates are serving.9° Second,
the severity of federal sentences has been widely criticized.9 1
Third, the frontline sentencing actors in the federal systemjudges, defense attorneys, and prosecutors-have behaved as if
they believe that federal sentences are often longer than neces92
sary.
446 (cited in note 46) (describing the degree to which particular state guideline systems
are mandatory).
0 See Kate Stith and Jos6 A. Cabranes, Fear of Judging Sentencing Guidelines in
the Federal Courts 59-65 (Chicago 1998) (discussing the Guidelines' role in increasing
average sentences).
91 See, for example, id.
See Daniel J. Freed, FederalSentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: Unacceptable
Limits on the Discretion of Sentencers, 101 Yale L J 1681, 1718-27 (1992) (describing
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From 1980-2002, the number of federal prison inmates in94
creased by more than 600 percent, from 24,36393 to 163,528.
The percentage of federal defendants sentenced to a purely probationary sentence declined from roughly 48 percent in 1984, 9' to
15.5 percent in 1990,96 to 9.1 percent in 2002." 7 From 1984 to
1990, the mean sentence length imposed by judges for all federal
crimes in which a prison sentence was imposed nearly doubled
from 24 months to 46 months. 9 By 1992, the mean sentence imposed increased by almost another 50 percent to 66.9 months. 99
Interestingly, the mean federal sentence leveled off in 1993-94,1°°
and has declined slowly to 55.4 months in 2002.101 Despite the
modest retreat in mean sentence length, in 2002, 85.9 percent of
federal defendants received prison sentences, 1 2 compared to 52
percent in 1984,1"' and the mean sentence of imprisonment in
2002 remained more than double what it had been in 1984.
The figures in the preceding paragraph measure the sentences imposed by judges. The SRA's abolition of parole and embrace of truth in sentencing also dramatically increased the proportion of imposed sentences actually served. For example, a federal defendant sentenced to ten years in 1986 would, on average,
have served slightly less than six years before release on parole.
Under the Guidelines, a defendant sentenced to ten years must
serve at least 87 percent of that term, or slightly more than 8.5
years, before release.'
The severity of federal criminal sentences has been persistently criticized by the media, academics, the defense bar, former
federal prosecutors, and the federal judiciary.1 °5 Even conservaways in which sentencing actors attempt to avoid the Guidelines).
9 Bureau of Justice Statistics, Prisonersin 1994 1 (1995).
4 Bureau of Justice Statistics, Pisonersin 20021 (2003).
9 United States Sentencing Commission, 2 The Federal Sentencing Guidelines:A
Report on the Operation of the Guidelines System andShort-Term Impacts on Disparity
in Sentencing, Use of Incarceration,and ProsecuterialDiscretion and Plea Bargaining
376 Fig 14 (1991).
96 United States Sentencing Commission, AnnualReport: 199052 Fig 4 (1991).
" United States Sentencing Commission, 2002 Sourcebook at 27 Fig D (cited in note
37).
98 United States Sentencing Commission, 2 The FederalSentencing Guidelines378.
9 United States Sentencing Commission, Annual Report: 199561 Fig F (1996).
100 Id.
101 United States Sentencing Commission, 2002 Sourcebook 30 Table 14 (cited in note
37). The mean federal sentence declined to 54.9 months in 2001 before ticking back up to
55.4 months in 2002. Id at 27 Fig D.
102 Id at 28 Table 12.
10' United States Sentencing Commission, 2 The FederalSentencing Guidelines378.
104See Hofer and Semisch, 12 Fed Sent Rptr at 13 (cited in note 75).
105 See, for example, Aaron Rappaport, The State of Severity, 12 Fed Sent Rptr 3
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tive law-and-order jurists such as Justice Anthony Kennedy have
argued that federal law requires imposition of prison sentences
too often and for terms that are too long.'16
The behavior of federal judges and prosecutors also suggests
that, as a group, they may see federal sentences as being unduly
stringent, or at least as being longer than necessary to achieve
the ends of justice. For example, in contrast to state guideline
systems-in which rates of upward and downward departures
from guidelines or presumptive ranges are generally comparable-more than 34 percent of all federal cases receive downward
departures,0 7 while less than 1 percent receive upward departures. 0 8 And at least one study has found that judges, prosecutors, and other frontline sentencing actors exercised their discretion throughout the 1990s to gradually reduce average sentences
in drug cases.0 9 It is, of course, misleading to treat all federal
sentences as an undifferentiated lump. Not even the harshest
critics of the Guidelines view sentences for all classifications of

(1999); Michael Tonry, Sentencing Matters 78-79 (Oxford 1996); Kevin Blackwell, A
Comparison of State andFederalGuidelines: The ResentencingProject24 (United States
Sentencing Commission) (finding that in thirty-six of fifty sentencing comparisons, defendants faced more severe penalties under federal law than in the four state systems compared); Frank 0. Bowman, III, Playing "21" with Narcotics Enforcement: A Response to
ProfessorCarrington,52 Wash & Lee L Rev 937, 981-83 (1995) (criticizing the severity of
federal drug sentences).
In addition, there is a substantial body of literature noting that American criminal
sentences, both federal and state, are substantially higher than is the case in most other
Western democracies. See, for example, James Q. Whitman, Harsh Justice: Criminal
Punishment and the Widening Divide Between America and Europe (Oxford 2003); Bureau of Justice Statistics, German andAmerican Prosecutions:An Approach to Statistical
Comparison27-35 (GPO 1998); Richard S. Frase, Sentencingin Germany and the United
States: ComparingApfel with Apples 51-52 (Max Planck Inst 2001); Richard S. Frase,
SentencingLaws & Practicesin France,7 Fed Sent Rptr 275 (1995); James P. Lynch, A
Comparison of Prison Use in England,Canada, West Germany,and the United States. A
Limited Test of the Punitive Hypothesis, 79 J Crim L & Criminol 180, 198 (1988). Consider Michael Tonry and Richard S. Frase, eds, Sentencing and Sanctions in Western
Countries (Oxford 2001); Michael Tonry and Kathleen Hatlestad, eds, SentencingReform
in Overcrowded Times: A ComparativePerspective(Oxford 1997).
o Anthony M. Kennedy, Speech at the American Bar Association Annual Meeting
(Aug 9, 2003), available at <http'//www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp-08-0903.html> (last visited Apr 2, 2005) (observing that because federal sentences are often too
long the "Federal Sentencing Guidelines should be revised downward," and that "[i]n too
many cases, mandatory minimum sentences are unwise and unjust").
107 United States Sentencing Commission, 2002 Sourcebook 51 Fig G (cited in note
37). Roughly half of these downward departures are "substantial assistance" departures
awarded on motion of the government for cooperation in the investigation or prosecution
of others. The other half are downward departures ordered by judges for some other reason.
108 Id.
"o Bowman and Heise, 87 Iowa L Rev 480 (cited in note 84).
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federal crime as being too severe. But sentence severity is undoubtedly a common theme in many critiques of the Guidelines.
2.

Rigidity.

The severity critique is customarily intertwined with the
complaint that the current federal sentencing system is too rigid
because it provides too little flexibility for the sentencing judge to
account for circumstances unique to the defendant or peculiar to
the case.11 ° "Rigidity" is one of the trickiest points about the current system to assess because what appears to one observer as
undue rigidity may appear to another as nothing more than a
necessary incident of bringing law to a previously lawless sentencing regime. Nonetheless, several themes customarily emerge
in discussions of this issue.
First, one common complaint is directed not at the SRA or
the Sentencing Guidelines, but at the framework of statutory
mandatory minimum sentences Congress has overlaid onto the
Guidelines system for certain classes of offenses, most notably
drug and firearm crimes.111 For example, the enactment in 1986
of tough statutory quantity-based mandatory minimum drug
sentences 1 12 influenced the shape and severity of the drug guidelines promulgated in 1987.113 These mandatory minimums also
block the exercise of the otherwise available judicial departure
power in cases to which they apply.
Second, some have argued that even without mandatory
minimums, the existing guidelines are too rigid.1 4 This sort of
rigidity arises from a combination of the complexity of the Guidelines and the relatively tight constraints placed on judicial authority to depart from the sentencing range generated by the
Guidelines. The complexity of the sentencing grid and the accompanying rules forces judges to make detailed factual and le110 See, for example, Frase, 78 Judicature at 178 (cited in note 46) ("[S]tate guidelines

generally appear to be more balanced than the federal version. Offender characteristics
receive more weight in most state systems, departures are more common, sentencing is
less severe, and sentencing power, at both the policy-making and individual case level, is
shared more broadly.").
m See, for example, Kennedy, Speech at the American Bar(cited in note 106).
112 Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 (ADAA), Pub L No 99-570, 100 Stat 3207-2 (1986),
codified in 21 USC § 801 et seq (2000).
113 For discussion of how the mandatory minimum sentences of the ADAA affected the
structure of guideline drug sentences, see Bowman, 105 Colum L Rev at 1329-32 (cited in
note 78).
114 See, for example, Freed, 101 Yale L J at 1752-53 (cited in note 92) ("[T]he Commission elected the wrong policies for federal sentencing reform. ... It has opted for rigidity rather than flexibility in its approach.").
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gal determinations that generate a fairly narrow range of possible sentences within which the judge must impose a sentence,
unless he or she "departs" based on yet another set of factual
findings.
Some Guidelines critics have contended that the rules governing a judge's power to depart from the range are too restrictive. One common complaint has been that, with respect to
awarding departures, the Guidelines bar consideration of many
of the characteristics of a defendant or circumstances of his
background that have traditionally been considered to mitigate
punishment. 115 In addition, Congress and the courts have disagreed about the degree to which appellate courts should police
the award of downward departures. In Koon v United States,"'
the Supreme Court tacitly encouraged departures by holding
that the applicable standard of appellate review should be abuse
of discretion." 7 In the PROTECT Act of 2003, Congress took a
different and more restrictive view of departures, mandating
changes in Guidelines rules governing departures, legislatively
repealing Koon, and mandating de novo appellate review of departures."'
3.

Complexity.

Many critics have contended that the Guidelines are too
complex to understand or apply," 9 but I am skeptical that this
has very often been the case when, as was true prior to Blakely,
the persons applying and interpreting the Guidelines were lawyers and judges. 2 ' The Guidelines' complexity, however, may
indeed prove to be a barrier to their application in the context of
jury trials, a point to which we will return later.
The Guidelines' complexity is at the root of their failure, but
not because the Guidelines are too hard to understand. Complex115 Id at 1715 ("Perhaps no provisions in the guidelines evoke more dismay from the
federal judiciary, the probation service, and the bar than the policy statements assembled
in chapter 5H.").
116 518 US 81 (1996).
117 Id at 99.
'18 PROTECT Act § 401(m), 117 Stat at 675.
"n See, for example, Stith and Cabranes, FearofJudgingat 3, 33, 91-93 (cited in note
90) (contending that the Guidelines are too complex and suggesting that they may usefully be compared to the Internal Revenue Code); R. Barry Ruback and Jonathan
Wroblewski, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Psychologicaland Policy Reasons for
Simplication,7 Psych Pub Pol & L 739 (2001) (arguing that the complexity of the Guidelines undermines the purposes of sentencing reform).
120 See Bowman, 44 SLU L J at 328-29 (cited in note 76) (rejecting arguments that
the Guidelines are too complex to understand or apply).
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ity has had more subtle, but also more profound, effects on the
evolution of federal sentencing policy in the twenty years since
the enactment of the SRA. In particular, the Guidelines' complexity has contributed to their unreasonable rigidity and has
been a primary cause of an increasing institutional imbalance in
both the rulemaking and individual case.
4.

Institutional balance in sentencing.

The Guidelines system was supposed to remedy the former
system's excessive reliance on judicial discretion by distributing
sentence authority between the relevant institutional actors. At
the rulemaking level, the SRA created the Sentencing Commission, which was to serve as an expert, neutral rulemaker, reasonably insulated from direct political pressure, 2 ' and equally
importantly, serve as a forum for policy debate among other institutional actors-judges, prosecutors, the defense bar, probation officers, and interested community groups.'2 2 Congress was
to have ultimate authority over Commission rules, but would in
theory stay out of the details of sentencing policy, or would at
least give substantial deference to the Commission's judgment.
The Department of Justice would have a seat at the Sentencing
Commission table in order to express its position, but would be
only one among a number of important voices.'23
At the individual case level, trial judges lost their former
plenary authority of front-end sentencing. But appellate judges
gained an unprecedented role in sentencing through the review
function. And even trial judges retained significant discretionary
power through their unfettered authority to sentence anywhere
within the applicable range, through the power to depart from
the range upon appropriate grounds, and through the hidden,
but very real, de facto discretionary authority to find sentencing
facts. Prosecutors gained the authority inherent in being masters
121 Dale G. Parent, What Did the United States Sentencing Commission Miss 101
Yale L J 1773, 1775 (1992) (noting that the Minnesota Sentencing Commission, in contrast to the United States Sentencing Commission, realized that "[t]he creation of a
guidelines commission merely shifted the politics of sentencing reform from the legislature to a commission").
122 In the late 1990s, various commentators noted that the Sentencing Commission
was intended to serve as a forum for policy debate, and suggested improvements in the
Commission's procedures and institutional approach to better achieve that result. See
Marc L. Miller and Ronald F. Wright, Your Cheatin'Heart(land).The Long Search for
Administrative Sentencing Justice,2 Buff Crim L Rev 723 (1999); Frank 0. Bowman, III,
PracticalMagic: A Few Down-to-Earth Suggestionsfor the New Sentencing Commission,
12 Fed Sent Rptr 101, 103-04 (1999).
122 28 USC § 991(a) (1993 & Supp 2004).
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of the facts in a fact-driven guidelines system, but were supposed
to be prevented from achieving total dominance by the relevant
conduct rules and their obligation as officers of the court to report all potentially relevant sentencing facts to the court.124
The hoped-for institutional balance has broken down. The
former unwarranted judicial and parole board hegemony over
federal sentences has been replaced by an alliance of the Department of Justice and Congress at the rulemaking level, and
excessive control by prosecutors at the individual case level. I
have explained these trends in detail elsewhere, 125 but they can
be summarized as follows:
a) Institutional imbalance in sentencing rulemaking. Congress has plenary authority to make sentencing rules; however,
the SRA was supposed to create a system in which the direct exercise of that authority would be rare. The Justice Department,
for its part, will perennially be subject to the temptation to ask
for higher penalties, both because that is the instinctive disposition of prosecutors and because the Department knows that it
can always refrain from enforcing the law to its full extent if doing so seems too harsh. 2 6 But the SRA created a Sentencing
Commission on which the Justice Department is represented
only in a non-voting, ex officio capacity, plainly to ensure that
the views of prosecutors would not control the Commission's
choices. Yet the Congress/DOJ alliance now dominates sentencing rulemaking. Why?
" See Bowman, 1996 Wis L Rev at 724-32 (cited in note 9); Frank 0. Bowman, III,
To Tell the Truth: The Problem of Prosecutorial'Manipulation"of Sentencing Facts, 8
Fed Sent Rptr 324 (1996).
125 See Frank 0. Bowman, III, Pour encouragerles autres?The CuriousHistory and
DistressingImplications of the CriminalProvisions of the Sarbanes-OxleyAct and the
Sentencing Guidelines Amendments That Followed, 1 Ohio St J Crim L 373, 435-40
(2004); Bowman, 105 Colum L Rev 1315 (cited in note 78).
126 Prosecutorial charging and plea bargaining discretion is subject to few legally
enforceable limits. See Wayte v United States, 470 US 598 (1985). The central administration of the Department of Justice has attempted to maintain some administrative
control over the exercise of this discretion by local United States Attorney's Offices. See,
for example, Attorney General Janet Reno, Memorandum to Holders of the United States
Attorney's Manual, Ytie 9 (Oct 12, 1993), reprinted in 6 Fed Sent Rptr 352 (1994) (emphasizing that one of the purposes of the Principles of Federal Prosecution is to assure
that charging and plea bargaining practices do not undermine the SRA's goal of reducing
unwarranted sentencing disparity); Ashcroft, Charging of CriminalDefendants (cited in
note 86) (stating the Department of Justice policy on plea bargaining) However, the fact
remains that the Department of Justice as a national institution and both local U.S.
Attorney's Offices and Assistant United States Attorneys acting in their individual capacity retain significant discretion to refrainfrom enforcing the criminal law in its full rigor.
For a discussion of prosecutorial practice and the Reno memorandum, see generally Sara
Sun Beale, The New Reno Bluesheet: A Little More Candor Regarding Prosecutorial
Discretion,6 Fed Sent Rptr 310 (1994).
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First, the complexity of the Guidelines and the federal sentencing table tends to encourage continuing congressional intervention in the particulars of federal sentencing law. Indeed, it is
only the complexity of the table that makes repeated, detailed
congressional intervention politically useful and therefore likely.
In the pre-Guidelines era, Congress could not readily translate its concern about a class of high-profile crimes into specific
sentencing outcomes. Faced with a real or perceived outbreak of
criminal activity, Congress had four basic legislative options: (1)
it could increase appropriations to law enforcement agencies so
that more offenders could be caught and prosecuted, which might
prove effective, but which is inevitably expensive and thus requires raising taxes or the deficit, or reallocating resources currently dedicated to fighting other crimes; (2) it could create a new
crime covering the activity causing concern, but given the
breadth of existing federal criminal law, there are few crimes not
already covered by the federal code; (3) it could raise the statutory maximum penalty for existing statutory crimes covering the
activity, but neither before nor after the Guidelines did an increased statutory maximum have any necessary effect on actual
sentences (and in any case one can only raise statutory maximums so many times); and (4) it could legislate a statutory
minimum sentence for the activity, but Congress has been reluctant to impose minimums except in drug and gun cases (and,
once again, one can only impose mandatory sentences so many
times).
Once the Sentencing Commission gave birth to a 258-box
sentencing table with detailed instructions for placing defendants in those boxes, the options available to Members of Congress seeking a legislative response to a specific type of crime
mushroomed. The proliferation of fact-dependent and legally enforceable decision points created by overlapping guidelines and
statutory mandatory minimum sentences has given Congress a
mechanism to micro-manage sentencing policy.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the obvious political incentives for appearing tough on crime, almost all recent congressional intervention in the details of sentencing policy has been in
the direction of raising sentences.127 Still, neither the short-term
127

See Marc Mauer, Lessons of the "Get Tough " Movement in the United States, The

Sentencing Project at 2, available at <http://www.sentencingproject.org/pdfs/mauericpa.pdf> (last visited Apr 7, 2005) ("88% of [the rise in inmate populations from 1980-96]
was a result of changes in sentencing policy, and just 12% due to changes in crime.");
Bowman, 1 Ohio St J Crim L at 392-416, 431-35 (cited in note 125) (describing congres-
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political incentives favoring sentencing increases nor the complexity of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines can entirely explain
the behavior of Congress in the sentencing field. The political
incentives favoring sentence increases operate in state legislatures as well, and many states have guidelines systems, albeit
less complex ones, which their legislatures can amend. 12 Yet
over the last twenty years, states have both raised and lowered
sentences and the current trend in the states is toward moderation of penalties. 129 Why the difference?
The most obvious difference is budgetary. State legislatures
operate under two constraints that Congress lacks. First, states
are customarily obliged to balance their budgets, usually by
command of state law. 130 Second, the proportion of state budgets
devoted to law enforcement and corrections expenditures is far
higher than the equivalent proportion of the federal budget.' 3 '
Consequently, state legislators can only pursue a course of ever
higher sentences, ever more prisoners, and ever larger corrections costs for so long before the pure economic cost of such a
program begins to force unpleasant choices between building
more prisons and either cutting budgets for public goods-such
as education, health care, and road construction-or raising
taxes. In part for this reason, state sentencing guidelines systems have increasingly been used "to gain better control over
sional activity in the area of white collar crime sentencing).
12 See Frase, 44 SLU L J at 425 (cited in note 46) (surveying the structures and purposes of state sentencing guideline systems).
129 See Jon Wool and Don Stemen, ChangingFortunes or ChangingAttitudes? Sentencing and CorrectionsReforms in 2003, Vera Inst of Just (Mar 2004) (discussing how
state budget shortfalls have translated into reduction of criminal penalties); Daniel F.
Wilhelm and Nicholas R. Turner, Is the Budget Crisis Changing the Way We Look at
Sentencing andIncarceration, Vera Inst of Just (June 2002) (same).
"' See Ronald K Snell, State Balanced Budget Requirements: Provisions and Practice, available at <http'//www.ncsl.org/programs/fiscal/balbuda.htm> (last visited Apr 7,
2005) (outlining the nature of balanced budget requirements in all fifty states and Puerto
Rico).
131 From 2002-2004, corrections expenditures alone, not counting the costs of police
and courts, averaged roughly 7% of the general fund expenditures of the states. National
Association of State Budget Officers, 2003 State Expenditure Report 60, Table 34 (2004),
available at <http://www.nasbo.org/Publications/PDFs/2003ExpendReport.pdf>
(last
visited May 26, 2005). By contrast, in 2001, the Federal government spent approximately
$25 billion on direct expenditures for criminal and civil justice, including corrections,
courts, law enforcement, and civil justice costs. United States Department of Justice
Bureau of Justice Statistics, Expenditure and Employment Statistics, available at
<httpJ/www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/eande.htm> (last visited Apr 7, 2005). In 2001, the Federal
budget was $1.8 trillion, meaning that the federal expenditures for all criminal and civil
justice constituted approximately 1.4% of the federal budget in that year. Executive Office
of the President of the United States, A Citizen'sGuide to the FederalBudget: Budget of
the United States Government Fiscal Year 2001 at iii, available
at
<http'//www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fyOl/pdf/guide.pdf> (last visited Apr 7, 2005).

149]

RECONFIGURINGFEDERAL SENTENCING

173

rapidly escalating prison populations and correctional ex1 32
By contrast, because the federal government need not
penses."
balance its budget and federal correctional spending is such a
tiny fraction of the budget, Congress does not perceive itself to be
faced with the same stark choice between prisons or schools that
has begun to haunt their colleagues in America's statehouses.
The lack of perceived economic constraint on federal sentencing policy has led to a failure by Congress to perform its role of
balancing national priorities. Legislatures are supposed to make
resource allocation choices. But because Congress has never worried about the costs of the criminal laws it passes, it tends to see
criminal legislation purely in term of political effects-and inis almost always perceived as conferring pocreasing penalties
133
benefit.
litical
Congress thus has little reason to scrutinize Justice Department requests or its own members' initiatives seeking higher
sentences, and as a result, there is no restraint on the gradual
upward ratcheting of penalties made attractive by politics, and
made possible by the Guidelines' complex structure. This institutional imbalance has caused the feedback from front-line sentencing professionals to be ignored and prevented the Sentencing
Commission from adjusting the guidelines in response to experience.
b) Institutionalimbalance in the imposition of individual sentences. Since the advent of the Guidelines in 1987, local
United States Attorneys and their Assistants have exercised
an increasing amount of power over sentencing outcomes in
individual cases. This development is a direct consequence of a
fundamental attribute of guidelines systems: increasing the
complexity of a sentencing guidelines system tends to confer
power on prosecutors while limiting the power of judges. This
is particularly true if the guidelines are overlaid on a complex
criminal code containing an array of fact-dependent statutory
minimum sentence provisions. As the number of fact132 Frase, 78 Judicature at 175 (cited in note 46). See also, Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Guidelines in the States.: Lessons for State and FederalReformers, 10 Fed Sent Rptr
46, 46 (1997) ("[Sitate guideline reforms are increasingly motivated by a desire to gain
better control over escalating prison populations; several states (and the ABA Standards)
directly link recommended sentences to available correctional resources.").
13 See William J. Stuntz, The PathologicalPoliticsof CriminalLaw, 100 Mich L Rev
505 (2001) (illustrating how political aspects of criminal legislation tend to yield overbroad statutes that allow politicians to reap political benefits without making difficult
decisions over implementation).
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dependent rules potentially applicable to the sentence of each
defendant increases, so too does the number of opportunities
for a prosecutor to control each defendant's sentence-by
charging or not charging crimes or statutory enhancements,
proving or not seeking to prove facts determinative of guideline adjustments, or moving or not moving for various types of
departures. Because the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and
associated statutory provisions are, taken together, one of the
most complex sentencing regimes ever devised, the effect is to
confer on prosecutors a very high degree of control over sentencing outcomes.
5.

Relevant conduct.

One of the issues facing the designers of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines was whether, when assessing offense seriousness, the sentencing judge would be allowed to consider only
facts directly and intimately related to the particular offense or
offenses of which a defendant was convicted by trial or plea, or
whether a judge could consider all facts about what a defendant
really did in relation to those offenses."' The concern of the
drafters was that a pure offense-of-conviction system would allow
the parties, and more particularly the prosecutor, to control sentencing outcomes by limiting the scope of a defendant's sentencing liability through charge manipulation and bargaining. 135 To
take but one simple example, a defendant who engaged in a series of five drug transactions with an undercover officer, each
involving 100 grams of powder cocaine, could be charged with or
permitted to plead to possession with intent to distribute 100,
200, 300, 400, or 500 grams. Given the Guidelines' reliance on
quantity to set drug sentence lengths, the parties could effectively decide between them what sentence the defendant received, and the judge would have no meaningful ability to override that decision even if she were fully aware of all facts about
the defendant's conduct. If outcomes were freely negotiable between the litigants, the objective of reducing unwarranted disparity would be undermined. The Guidelines sought to solve this
problem through the "relevant conduct" rule that permits, indeed
" See Wilkins and Steer, 41 SC L Rev at 497-500 (cited in note 67) (discussing the
Sentencing Commission's choice between an offense-of-conviction system and a relevantconduct system).
13- See Stanley A. Weigel, The SentencingReform Act of 1984: A PracticalAppraisal,
36 UCLA L Rev 83, 93-95 (1988) (discussing the problems that plea bargaining presents
for application of the Guidelines).
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requires, judicial consideration of a broad array of conduct related to the offense of conviction.
Of course, the ability to manipulate the system in this way
remains under the existing system, but only insofar as the government is willing to conceal evidence from the court (or the
court is willing to blink at evidence it knows of, but which the
parties exclude from the terms of their plea agreement). There is
at least anecdotal evidence that "fact-bargaining" of this sort
does occur.'3 6
The Guidelines drafters not only felt that relevant conduct
was necessary to limit prosecutorial control over sentencing outcomes, but also argued that judges had always been able to consider all facts about both the crime(s) of conviction and related
137
incident(s) in setting a sentence within the statutory range.
Those concerned about the effect of relevant conduct note that,
while pre-Guidelines judges could consider facts not directly
within the ambit of the crime(s) of conviction, they were never
required to do so. 138 Moreover, the complexity of the Guidelines
plays a role in increasing the effects of relevant conduct. The fact
that the Guidelines assign mandatory weight to so many facts
increases the opportunities for relevant conduct not directly implicated by the offense of conviction to influence the sentence.
The combination of the wider factual net thrown by the relevant
concept rule, the complexity of the Guidelines, and the requirement that sentencing facts be proven only to a preponderance in
a proceeding with reduced procedural protections, has been
thought to give relevant conduct disproportionate weight in the
sentencing process.' 39 This argument is captured in the metaphor
of "the tail which wags the dog," discussed by the Supreme Court
in Blakely4 ° and a number of previous sentencing cases.'
116 See Stephen J. Schulhofer and Ilene H. Nagel, Plea Negotiations Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Guideline Circumvention and Its Dynamics in the PostMistretta Period,91 Nw U L Rev 1284, 1292 (1997) (finding that the Guidelines are circumvented or evaded in roughly 20-35 percent of the cases resolved through guilty pleas).
137 See Breyer, 17 Hofstra L Rev at 10-11 (cited in note 13) ("Typically, courts have
found post-trial sentencing facts without a jury and without the use of such rules of evidence as the hearsay or best evidence rules, or the requirement of proof of facts beyond a
reasonable doubt.").
138 Frankel, Criminal Sentences at 26-38 (cited in note 16) (discussing the preGuidelines trial judge's broad discretionary power over pre-sentencing hearings). For a
wide-ranging critique of the relevant conduct feature of the Guidelines, see American
College of Lawyers, Proposed Modifications to the Relevant Conduct Provision of the
United States Sentencing Guidelihnes(2001),reprinted in 38 Am Crim L Rev 1463 (2001).
139 See Blakely, 124 S Ct at 2539.
140 Id.
141 See Apprendi, 530 US at 563 (Breyer dissenting); Almendarez-Torres v United
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In sum, the basic critique of the federal sentencing system as
it existed in June 2004 was that it tended to produce unduly severe sentences, was too rigid and too complex, was institutionally
imbalanced at both the rulemaking and individual case levels,
and tended to rely too heavily on sentencing factors not found by
juries or admitted as part of pleas. Whatever the force of this
critique, there seemed little immediate prospect of fundamental
reform of a system so well-entrenched and so advantageous to
Congress and federal prosecutors. Then the Supreme Court
reared back and hurled a high, hard one in the form of Blakely v
Washington, followed in short order by Booker v UnitedStates, a
knuckleball that would make Phil Niekro jealjurisprudential
2
ous.

14

III. THE IMPACT OF BLAKELYAND BOOKER
A.

Blakely v Washington

Blakely involved a challenge to the Washington State Sentencing Guidelines. 4 In Washington, pre-Blakely, a defendant's
conviction of a felony produced two immediate sentencing consequences. First, the conviction rendered the defendant legally subject to a sentence within the upper boundary set by the statutory
maximum sentence for the crime of conviction, and second, the
conviction placed the defendant in a presumptive sentencing
range set by the state sentencing guidelines within the statutory
minimum and maximum sentences.'" Under the Washington
State Sentencing Guidelines, a judge was empowered to adjust
this range upward, but not beyond the statutory maximum, upon
a post-conviction judicial finding of additional facts. For example,
Blakely was convicted of second degree kidnapping with a firearm, a class B felony that carried a statutory maximum sentence
of ten years. 4 ' The fact of conviction generated a "standard
range" of 49 to 53 months; 146 however, the judge found that
States, 523 US 224, 243 (1998); UnitedStates v Watts, 519 US 148, 157 n 2; McMillan v
Pennsylvania,477 US 79, 88 (1986).
142 Phil Niekro was one of the most famous knucideball pitchers of the modern era.
Baseball Almanac, Phil Niekro, available at <http'//www.baseball-almanac.com/players/
player.php?p=niekrph0l> (last visited Apr 7, 2005).
143 124 S Ct at 2531.
'44 See id at 2535.
'" See Wash Rev Code Ann §§ 9A-40.030(3), 9A.20.021(1)(b) (West 2003).
146See id at § 9.94A-515 (seriousness level V for second-degree kidnapping); id at App
27 (offender score two based on § 9.94A.525); id at § 9.94A.510(1) box 2-V (standard range
of thirteen to seventeen months); id at § 9.94A.510(3)(b) (thirty-six month firearm en-
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Blakely had committed the crime with "deliberate cruelty"-a
statutorily enumerated factor that permitted imposition of a sentence above the standard range' 4 7-and imposed a sentence of 90
months. 14' The United States Supreme Court found that imposithe defendant's Sixth
tion of the enhanced sentence violated
149
Amendment right to a trial by jury.
In reaching its result, the Court relied on a rule it first announced four years before in Apprendi: "Other than the fact of a
prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to
a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." 5 ° In the years
since Apprendi,many observers (including myself) assumed that
Apprendls rule applied only if a post-conviction judicial finding
of fact could raise the defendant's sentence higher than the
maximum sentence allowable by statute for the underlying offense of conviction.' 5 ' For example, in Apprendi itself, the maximum statutory sentence for the crime of which Apprendi was
convicted was ten years, but under New Jersey law the judge
was allowed to raise that sentence to twenty years if, after the
trial or plea, he found that the defendant's motive in committing
the offense was racial animus.' 52 The Supreme Court held that
increasing Apprendi's sentence beyond the ten-year statutory
maximum based on a post-conviction judicial finding of fact was
unconstitutional. 5 3
In Blakely, however, the Court found that the Sixth
Amendment can be violated even by a sentence below what has
always before been considered the statutory maximum. Henceforward, "the 'statutory maximum' for Apprendi purposes is the
maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the
facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant." 154 Any fact that increases a defendant's "statutory maximum," as newly defined in Blakely, must be found by a jury.
hancement).
147 See id at § 9.94A.535(2)(a).
148 See Blakely, 124 S Ct at 2535.
149 Id at 2543.
150 Apprendi, 530 US at 490.
'51See Stephanos Bibas, Judicial Fact-Findingand Sentence Enhancements in a
World of Guilty Pleas, 110 Yale L J 1097, 1102-23 (2001) (discussing Supreme Court
cases regarding the distinction between elements of a crime and sentencing factors);
Nancy J. King and Susan R. Klein, AprmsApprendi, 12 Fed Sent Rptr 331 (2000) (discussing the appeals of sentences affected by Apprendi).
152 Apprendi, 530 US at 468-69.
153 Id at 491-97.
'5'Blakely, 124 S Ct at 2537 (emphasis in original).
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Thus, the Blakely model of constitutional sentencing practice
seems to run as described below.
First, any fact, the proof of which exposed a defendant to a
higher theoretical maximum sentence than he could have been
subject to absent proof of that fact, was an "element" of a crime
(or at least something like an "element")155 and had to be proven
to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt or admitted by the defendant. It did not seem to matter whether the rule correlating the
fact with increased possible punishment was enacted by a legislature or an administrative body like a sentencing commission.
Most importantly, the concept of a maximum sentence appeared
to include the tops of fact-based presumptive sentencing ranges
situated below what had previously been understood to be statutory maximum sentences.
Second, the Supreme Court held in McMillan v Pennsylvania,15 6 and reaffirmed in Harris v United States,15 7 that a postconviction judicial finding of fact can increase a defendant's
minimum sentence, so long as that finding of fact does not increase the statutory maximum. Because Blakely did not overrule
the holding of Harris,a fact which, if proven, subjects a defendant to a minimum sentence, even a real and inescapable mandatory minimum sentence, is not considered to be an element of
the offense. Such a fact can be found by a judge post-conviction,
and is subject to a lower standard of proof, so long as the resultant minimum sentence is below the legislatively established
maximum sentence for the same crime.
Third, Blakely did not deny the power of a legislature to
specify a single punishment for a crime. Conversely, Blakely confirmed that if a legislature chooses to assign a range of punishments to proof of a crime, it may allow judges to impose a sentence anywhere within that range in the unchecked exercise of
their discretion. Thus, Blakely apparently permits legislatures or
155 Whether the facts that before Blakely would have been called "sentencing factors"

are now "elements" in every sense of the word remains an open question. For example, it
is clear that "elements" of a federal crime must be alleged in the indictment, but it is so
far unclear whether these new element-like sentencing factors must be alleged in the
indictment or whether due process might be satisfied by information or some other form
of pre-trial pleading. Similarly, if a pre-Blakely "element" was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the trial court would have an obligation under FRCrP 29 to dismiss the
charge containing the unproven element. But failure to prove a post-Blakely element-like
sentencing factor seems unlikely to require dismissal of the underlying charge. Rather,
the failure of proof would probably only bar the sentencing enhancement associated with
the unproven element.
1- 477 US 79 (1986).
157 536 US 545 (2002).
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sentencing commissions to create entirely advisory guidelines
suggesting additional non-element facts that judges should take
into account in imposing sentences below the statutory maximum. But Blakely does not seem to permit a system in which a
post-conviction judicial finding of non-element facts could generate even a presumptive sentencing range with a maximum sentence lower than the statutory maximum.
Fourth, Justice Scalia believed that the Blakely result was
necessary "to give intelligible content to the right of jury trial."5 8
Exactly what Justice Scalia meant by this is not entirely clear;
however, it is fair to surmise that he intended Blakely as a partial response to the argument about the tail of relevant conduct
wagging the sentencing dog. 5 ' That is, at a minimum he intended jury fact-finding to set meaningful limits on a defendant's
maximum sentencing exposure.
Accordingly, the Guidelines seemed to fall afoul of the
Blakely rule. The Guidelines are essentially indistinguishable
from the Washington guidelines struck down in Blakely. In both
systems, the fact of conviction generates a guideline sentencing
range bounded at the top by a maximum sentence, which is below the absolute statutory limit for the crime, but cannot be legally exceeded in the absence of post-conviction judicial findings
of fact."'6 And in both systems, post-conviction judicial findings of
fact raise both the bottom and top of the guideline range, and by
raising the top of the range increase the length of a defendant's
possible guideline sentence.

8 Blakely, 124 S Ct at 2538.
159

Indeed, Justice Scalia expressly invokes the metaphor in his opinion. He says of

that those who criticize the Apprendi decision must either grant legislatures the unfettered right to designate elements and sentencing factors, or conclude that "legislatures
may establish legally essential sentencing factors within limits-limits crossed when,
perhaps, the sentencing factor is a 'tail which wags the dog of the substantive offense.'
What this means in operation is that the law must not go too far-it must not exceed the
judicial estimation of the proper role of the judge. The subjectivity of this standard is
obvious." Blakely, 124 S Ct at 2539.
16 For example, conviction of bank robbery exposes the defendant to a statutory
maximum sentence of twenty years imprisonment. 18 USC § 2113 (2004). The fact of
conviction generates a base offense level of 20 under USSG § 2B3.1(a) (2004). Standing
alone, a base offense level of 20 generates a sentencing guideline range of 33-41 months,
assuming that the defendant is a first-time offender. USSG § 5A (2004) (Sentencing Table). However, if the sentencing judge finds, post-conviction, that the defendant used a
firearm in the commission of the robbery or injured a victim, the offense level can be
increased by up to eleven levels, USSG §§ 3B3.1(b)(2), (3) (2004) pushing the defendant's
guideline range up to 108-135 months. USSG § 5A (Sentencing Table). Further increases
are possible for judicial findings of amount of loss and other factors. USSG § 3B3.1(b)(7).
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Although in Blakely the Supreme Court reserved ruling on
the applicability of its holding to the federal guidelines,16 ' the
obvious implications of the opinion caused immediate consternation. Within weeks after Blakely, dozens of federal trial and appellate courts issued opinions on whether it affected the federal
sentencing system, and if so how. 16 2 A legion of commentators
added their voices to the conversation.'6 3 From this cascade of
analysis, three basic possibilities seemed to emerge.
First, the Department of Justice and a number of courts of
appeals contended that the federal sentencing system should
survive Blakely intact.' They attempted to distinguish the federal system from the Washington state system at issue in
Blakely because Washington's guideline sentencing ranges were
set by statute while the federal guidelines were drafted by a sentencing commission.
Second, some courts and commentators suggested that the
Supreme Court could "Blakely-ize" the Guidelines by holding
that their sentencing rules survive, but requiring substitution of
a system of jury trials and jury waivers for the structure of postconviction judicial fact-finding and appellate review created by
the SRAj16
Third, other courts and commentators argued that the
Guidelines' sentencing rules could not be severed from the procedure of post-conviction judicial fact-finding contemplated by the
SRA and formalized in the Guidelines.'6 6 In this view, Blakely
rendered the Guidelines unconstitutional in toto. The practical
Blakely, 124 S Ct at 2538 n 9.
See Frank 0. Bowman, III, Thain Wreck? Or Can the FederalSentencing System
Be Saved? A Plea for Rapid Reversal ofBlakely v. Washington, 41 Am Crim L Rev 217,
226-49 (2004) (describing and analyzing the opinions issued during July and August
2004 by federal courts applying Blakelyto the Guidelines).
" For a general discussion, see Considering the Post-Blakely World, 17 Fed Sent
Rptr 1 (2004) (containing articles discussing Blakelyby Frank 0. Bowman, III, Albert W.
Alschuler, Steven L. Chanenson, Larry Kupers, Jane L. McClellan and Jon M. Sands,
Aaron Rappaport, Ian Weinstein and Nathaniel Z. Marmur, Jon Wool and Don Stemen,
Rory K Little and Teresa Chen, and the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission).
'" Bowman, 41 Am Crim L Rev at 227-28 (cited in note 162). See also, UnitedStates
v Reese, 382 F3d 1308 (11th Cir 2004); United States v Mincey, 380 F3d 102 (2d Cir
2004); United States v Hammoud, 378 F3d 426 (4th Cir 2004) (en banc); United States v
Koch, 383 F3d 436 (6th Cir 2004).
" Bowman, 41 Am Crim L Rev at 228-29 (cited in note 162); UnitedStates vBooker,
375 F3d 508 (7th Cir 2004); UnitedStates vAmeline, 376 F3d 967 (9th Cir 2004).
" Bowman, 41 Am Crim L Rev at 239-41 (cited in note 162). See also, Albert W.
Alschuler, To Sever or not to Sever? Why Blakely Requires Action by Congress, 17 Fed
Sent Rptr 11 (2004); United States v Croxford,324 F Supp 2d 1230 (D Utah 2004); United
States v Mueffelman, 327 F Supp 2d 79 (D Mass 2004); United States v Ing,328 F Supp
2d 1276 (M D Fla 2004).
161
162
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effect of such a ruling was thought to be that the Guidelines
would become either wholly void and legally nugatory or at most
advisory.
B.

Booker v UnitedStates

And then, just as the legal world was digging in its spikes
and preparing to deal with some post-Blakely heat from Justice
Scalia, it looked up to find Justice Breyer on the mound and the
Booker opinion giggling toward the plate.'67 In United States v
Booker,'68 the same five-member majority that had prevailed in
B]akelj 69 found that the Guidelines process of post-conviction
judicial fact-finding was unconstitutional under the Sixth
Amendment, 7 ° but an almost completely different five-member
majority' 7 ' wrote the opinion describing the proper remedy for
the constitutional violation. Justice Breyer, writing for the remedial majority, did not require juries to find all sentenceenhancing guidelines facts, nor did he invalidate the Guidelines
in toto. Instead, he merely excised two short sections of the
SRA,7 ' leaving the remainder of the SRA in place, and thus
keeping the guidelines intact but rendering them "effectively advisory. ""' Perhaps even more importantly, the remedial opinion
found that both the government and defendants retained a right
to appeal sentences, and that appellate courts should review sentences for "reasonableness."'74
The Booker opinion stunned and amazed the sentencing
world for at least three reasons. First, the Court's selective editing of the text of the SRA is, at the least, an arresting spectacle.
Justices Scalia and Stevens argue that this approach to severability analysis is unprecedented and illegitimate,'75 while Justice Breyer disclaims any novelty.'76 Whoever is correct, the
Court's approach was certainly a surprising assertion of judicial
7
power.1

167It was said of pitcher Phil Niekro's knuckleball that it "actually giggles at you as it
goes by." Baseball Almanac, PhilNikro(cited in note 142).
16 125 S Ct 738 (2005).
169 Justices Scalia, Stevens, Thomas, Souter, and Ginsburg.
170

125 S Ct at 755-56.

Only Justice Ginsburg joined both halves of the Court's opinion.
172 18 USC § 3553(b)(1) (2004) and 18 USC § 3742(e) (2004).
173 125 S Ct at 756.
171

174

125 S Ct at 765-66.

125 S Ct 776-79 (Stevens dissenting); 125 S Ct 792-95 (Scalia dissenting).
125 S Ct at 757 ("To say this is not to create a new kind of severability analysis.").
177 Writing after Blakely but before Booker, I discussed the possibility that the Court
might excise § 3553(b) and judicially amend and reinterpret § 3742, but dismissed this
175
176
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The second puzzlement is figuring out what Booker means.
The remedial opinion lends itself to different interpretations.
Some have been tempted to read "advisory" to mean that the
Guidelines are no longer legally binding on trial judges and that
the Guidelines are now merely useful suggestions to sentencing
courts.' However, a closer reading of the opinion suggests something quite different. First, because the opinion leaves virtually
the entire SRA and all of the Guidelines intact, the requirement
that judges find facts and make Guideline calculations based on
those facts survives. Second, because the remedies opinion retains a right of appeal of sentences and imposes a reasonableness
standard of review, appellate courts will have to determine what
is reasonable. The remedies opinion left undisturbed 18 USC §
3553(a), which lists the factors a judge must consider in imposing
a sentence and includes on that list the type and length of sentence called for by the Guidelines. Thus, the determination of
"reasonableness" under the statute will necessarily include consideration of whether a sentence conforms to the Guidelines. The
unresolved question is the weight that will be accorded to the
Guidelines sentence-will it be considered at least presumptively
correct or will it be reduced to the status of only one among
many other factors?
The third mystery about the Booker remedial opinion is how
it can possibly be squared with either the announced black-letter
rule or the underlying theory of the Blakely opinion it purports
to apply. Writing after Blakely, but before Booker, I considered
the approach ultimately adopted in Booker, but dismissed it as
fatally inconsistent with Blakely.
Only two possibilities seem to exist [if the Court judicially
edits out Section 3553(b) and creates its own version of
judicial review]. Either a judge's findings of fact and conidea as improbable because it "would require the Court to declare that it has the power to
selectively invalidate subsections of statutory provisions to create the federal sentencing
system it would prefer in place of the system Congress enacted." Bowman, 41 Am Crim L
Rev at 246 (cited in note 162).
178 Justices Stevens and Scalia adopt this view in their Booker dissents. 125 S Ct at
787 (Stevens dissenting) ("[J]udges must still considerthe sentencing range contained in
the Guidelines, but that range is now nothing more than a suggestion that may or may
not be persuasive to a judge when weighed against the numerous other considerations
listed in 18 USCA § 3553(a).") (emphasis in original); id at 179 (Scalia dissenting) ("Thus,
logic compels the conclusion that the sentencing judge, after considering the recited factors (including the Guidelines), has full discretion, as full as what he possessed before the
Act was passed, to sentence anywhere within the statutory range. If the majority thought
otherwise-if it thought the Guidelines not only had to be 'considered' (as the amputated
statute requires) but had generally to be followed-its opinion would surely say so.").
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clusions of law leading to determination of a guideline
range would create some presumption of the propriety of a
sentence in that range, or the determination of a range
would create no such presumption and the guideline calculation would have no legal significance. In the former
case, meaningful appellate review of the district court's
final sentencing decision would presumably require examination of the correctness of the guideline calculation
that generated the presumptively correct range and an
evaluation of any decision to sentence outside the resultant range. If so, regardless of the standard used by the
appellate court to review the trial court's legal determinations and its ultimate sentencing choice, the resultant regime looks very much like both the current Guidelines
and the Washington scheme struck down in Blakely. In
the latter case, the Guidelines would create no greater legal constraint on district court sentencing discretion than
if no guidelines existed at all, and there would be nothing
for an appellate court to review. In short, the options
seem to be either purely advisory guidelines subject to no
appellate review or Guidelines subject to appellate review
179
that cannot survive Blakely.
Justice Breyer was plainly unimpressed by this line of argument. Of course, there is no inconsistency between Booker and
Blakely if the "effectively advisory" guidelines given to us by
Booker are advisory in the sense of being useful, but legally nonbinding, suggestions. But, as noted above, Booker not only salvages the Guidelines rules and the system of judicial fact-finding
necessary to apply them, but strongly intimates that the guideline ranges produced by applying the rules to the facts continue
to constrain judicial discretion. If that is so, Booker cannot be
squared with Blakely, although it requires some careful analysis
to see exactly why.
Consider the position of a post-Booker sentencing judge who
has found the facts and made the Guideline calculations necessary to generate a Guideline range. Assume that the judge wants
to impose a sentence outside the guideline range. The judge must
provide an explanation for such a sentence because under
Booker, a court of appeals will review that sentence for its reasonableness and because the SRA requires an explanation of a
179

Bowman, 41 Am Crim L Rev at 246-47 (cited in note 162).
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sentence outside the Guideline range.' ° Although the number of
possible reasons for imposing a sentence outside the Guidelines
might seem endless, the explanations for doing so must fall into
one of two categories. Either the sentencing judge must explain
that he disagrees with the policy choices by the Commission and
Congress that produced the sentencing range at issue, or the
judge must explain that one of the factors listed in 18 USC §
3553(a) other than compliance with the Guidelines should trump
the policy judgments embodied in that range. An example of the
first sort of explanation would be a judge who sentenced a crack
defendant below the Guideline range because he disagreed with
the policy setting the crack-powder ratio at 100-1,181 or a judge
who sentenced an environmental crime defendant above the
guideline range because he believed that the Guidelines systematically under-punish such offenses. An example of the second
sort of explanation would be a judge who found that the circumstances of a defendant's life and upbringing made it particularly
likely that he could be rehabilitated with a non-incarcerative
sentence lower than that called for by the guidelines, or a judge
who imposed an above-range sentence on a white collar defendant after finding that the defendant's uniquely visible position
in his industry would generate special deterrent value for a high
sentence.
The critical point about post-Booker sentences imposed outside the Guidelines is the place of appellate review. If district
courts can freely disregard the Guidelines based on disagreement
with Congress or the Commission, and if courts of appeals cannot
180 18 USC § 3553(c)(2) (2004) requires that the sentencing court set forth "the specific
reason for the imposition of a sentence different from that described" by the Guidelines
range.
181 The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 ("ADAA") created different quantity-based mandatory minimum sentences for crack and powder cocaine; the amount of powder cocaine
required to trigger the five-year and ten-year minimum mandatory sentences prescribed
by the ADAA is one-hundred times greater than the amount of crack cocaine required to
trigger those sentences. 21 USC §§ 841(b), 963 (2004). Moreover, the quantities of crack
required to trigger mandatory sentences are quite small. See, for example, 21 USC §
841(b)(1)(A)(3) (2004) (ten-year minimum mandatory sentence for possession of fifty
grams of cocaine base); 21 USC § 841(b)(1)(B)(3) (2004) (five-year minimum mandatory
sentence for possession of five grams of cocaine base). The crack-powder differential has
proven controversial for two reasons. First, there has long been heated debate over
whether the differences in pharmacological potency or socially destructive effects of the
two chemical cousins are sufficient to justify their differential sentencing treatment.
United States Sentencing Commission, Report to the Congress: Cocaine and Federal
Sentencing Policy 90-91 (May 2002). Second, doubts about the desirability of the crackpowder distinction have been exacerbated by the fact that the overwhelming majority of
crack defendants are black, while the overwhelming majority of powder cocaine defendants are white or Hispanic. Id at 62.
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find a sentence imposed on that basis "unreasonable," then the
Guidelines become nothing more than suggestions. But as noted
above, the Booker remedial opinion does not endorse the Guidelines-as-suggestions rule. Rather, the marriage of reasonableness
review to the § 3553(b) factors seems to mean that district court
judges may now sentence outside the Guidelines only if they determine that other factors listed in § 3553(b) outweigh the guideline calculation. The function of the court of appeals will be (a) to
verify the accuracy of the Guidelines calculation, and (b) to make
a legal judgment about whether the district court has properly
balanced the non-Guidelines factors of § 3553(b) against the
weight accorded by the SRA to a properly determined guideline
range. The only real difference from the situation pre-Booker
would be an overlay of appellate case law delineating permissible
and impermissible grounds for a new class of departures that
might be christened "§3553(b) departures."
If this analysis is correct, then Booker preserves the Guidelines with the force of law. Even more importantly for purposes
of determining whether Booker squares with Blakely, it means
that the tops of the guideline ranges are effectively legally enforceable maximum sentences unless the sentencing judge determines that one or more § 3553(b) factors trumps the Guidelines. Implicit in any such determination is a factual finding-in
order for a § 3553(b) factor to trump the Guidelines range, the
judge must find that the facts triggering the application of the
factor exist. For example, a judge who wanted to impose an
above-range sentence on a white collar defendant because the
defendant's uniquely visible position in his industry would generate special deterrent value would have to make factual findings about this defendant's position in the industry and why exemplary punishment would have particularly salutary effects.
But a system that makes Guidelines ranges, or at least the tops
of Guidelines ranges, binding absent some additional finding of
fact is functionally indistinguishable from the Washington state
guidelines voided by Blakely.
Not only does Booker seem inconsistent with the rule formulated by Justice Scalia in Blakely, it seems equally inconsistent
with the rationale of that rule. Justice Scalia wished to assure
that juries play an important role in determining those facts essential to setting criminal sentences. So long as both Blakely and
Ham's were good law, the resulting constitutional sentencing
order was weirdly lopsided-juries were required to find only
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facts that increased theoretical maximum sentences, but not re1 2
quired to find facts that increased actual minimum sentences. 1
But, in this system, the jury did assume a heightened role. By
contrast, Booker effectively restores federal juries to their preBlakely position of sentencing impotence, while reasserting the
sentencing authority of judges. Whatever one may think about
the formalism of the rule enunciated by Justice Scalia, his concern about the decreasing connection between criminal punishment and facts found by juries or admitted by plea is surely legitimate and Booker leaves it unaddressed.
IV. THE POST-BOOKER OPTIONS So FAR

This section of the Article analyzes the options advanced to
date for post-Bakely/Booker revisions of the federal sentencing
system, and suggests that all of them suffer from significant defects, either substantively or because they stand little chance of
adoption in the current political environment. The next section
will suggest an alternative model that melds features of several
existing proposals to form a whole that, it is hoped, combines
substantive soundness with political viability.
A. Advisory Guidelines
In the immediate aftermath of Blakely, perhaps the most
commonly suggested response to the apparently impending invalidation of the Guidelines was that the Guidelines should be
made advisory, either permanently or for an interim period while
a permanent replacement for the Guidelines was devised."8 3 As it
turned out, in Booker the Supreme Court gave us "effectively
182

Bowman, 41 Am Crim L Rev at 253-55 (cited in note 162) (discussing the direc-

tional bias in the Sixth Amendment jury trial right created by Bakely).
'
See, for example, Testimony of Ronald Weich, Blakely v Washington and the Futare of the FederalSentencing Guidelines,Hearing Before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 108th Cong (2004), available at <http'//judiciary.senate.gov
/testimony.cfm?id=1260&witid=3685> (last visited Apr 7, 2005) (advocating a switch to
advisory Guidelines as a short-term solution); Testimony of Frank 0. Bowman, III, Defending America's Most Vulnerable: Safe Access to Drug Treatment and ChildProtection
Act of 2004, Hearing on HR 4547 Before the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and
Homeland Security, House Committee on the Judiciary, United States House of Representatives, 108th Cong (2004) ("Bowman House Testimony"), available at
<http'/judiciary.house.gov/media/pdfsbowman07O6O4.pdf> (last visited Apr 7, 2005)
(suggesting advisory guidelines as an interim measure); Testimony of Frank 0. Bowman,
111, Blakely v Washington and the Futureof the FederalSentencingGuidelines, Hearing
Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, US Senate, 108th Cong (2004) ("Bowman
Senate Testimony"), available at <http'//judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=1260&wit
jd=647> (last visited Apr 7, 2005) (same).
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advisory" guidelines without the need for legislation. However,
we do not yet know exactly what "effectively advisory" means.
Are the guidelines now only useful suggestions, or has Justice
Breyer restored the guidelines to the status of legally enforceable
rules, albeit rules with somewhat more room for the exercise of
judicial discretion than was previously the case? Unfortunately,
neither of these possible interpretations is either sustainable or
desirable over the long term.
1.

Purely advisory guidelines.

Having purely advisory guidelines could be quite useful for a
short period of time. It would be extraordinarily informative to
know how judges would apply the Guidelines if they were not
legally obliged to follow them; data on judicial behavior in such
an interim period would be of great help in revising the current
rules. That said, the Guidelines would not function well as a
purely advisory system over the long term.
In the first place, purely advisory guidelines in the sense of
useful, non-binding suggestions are simply a bad idea, at least in
the federal criminal courts. A system with no legal constraint on
judicial sentencing discretion would confer even more discretion
on federal district judges than they possessed before the SRA.
Prior to the SRA, although judges had largely untrammeled discretion to impose sentences, the Parole Commission retained
substantial authority over actual release dates. But the SRA
abolished parole,"l and in a post-Booker world with neither legally enforceable sentencing guidelines nor a Parole Commission,
judicial sentencing authority would be absolute.
Some will argue that even purely advisory guidelines would
constrain judicial discretion by establishing norms to which most
judges would adhere. While this might be true in the short term,
if for no other reason than that the federal bench has become
acculturated to the Guidelines over the last seventeen years, the
Guidelines structure cannot long be maintained except as a system of legally enforceable rules. The essential problem stems
from the Guidelines' complexity and the detailed fact-finding
they require. The participants in the current system develop and
present sentencing facts, perform intricate guideline calculations, litigate and adjudicate sentencing appeals, report and analyze guideline data, and revise guideline rules because these ac184

See Bowman, 1996 Wis L Rev at 680-90 (cited in note 9) (discussing pre-

Guidelines parole release authority).
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tivities matter in the sense of having necessary meaningful effects on sentencing outcomes. If the Guidelines ceased to be binding rules and became optional suggestions, fewer and fewer
judges would feel obliged to engage in the detailed fact-finding
process the Guidelines require. Even if the courts of appeals read
Booker to require judges to go through the formalities of factfinding as a procedural prerequisite for imposition of a valid sentence, facts without necessary legal consequence lose their importance and the rigor of the fact-finding process would undoubtedly degrade. As the process of degradation continued, it would
soon be difficult to determine the true relationship between the
facts of the case and the sentence imposed.
More importantly, the sentencing disparity the Guidelines
were designed to address would inevitably flourish in a system of
purely advisory guidelines. Some commentators have suggested
that advisory guidelines could achieve a high degree of judicial
compliance, pointing to the examples of states with both advisory
guidelines and a high judicial compliance rate." 5 The comparison
is inapt. The federal court system is far larger and more geographically dispersed than any state judiciary, thus rendering
inoperative the sort of informal peer compliance mechanisms
that can arise in a smaller, geographically concentrated state
judiciaries. Federal judges, unlike most of their state colleagues,
have life tenure8 6 and are thus far less amenable to the political
controls that exist in states where judges are customarily either
elected or appointed subject to periodic retention decisions by
voters.8 7 Finally, I strongly suspect that the relative severity of
the Guidelines in comparison to state sentencing laws 88 would
exert greater pressure on federal judges to deviate from the
nominally correct sentence than is true in states.'8 9 After a few
185

See, for example, Testimony of Amy Baron-Evans, Co-Chair, Practitioners Advi-

sory Group, Hearing before the United States Sentencing Commission at 9 (Feb 16, 2005),
available at <http://www.ussc.gov/hearings/02-15-05/Baron-Evans-testimony.pdf> (last
visited Apr 7, 2005).
186 See F. Andrew Hanssen, The Effect of JudicialInstitutions on Uncertaintyand the
Rate of Litigation: The Election Versus Appointment of State Judges, 28 J Legal Stud
205, 211-15 (1999).
187 Judges in about half of the states are appointed by either the governor or the legislature, while judges in the other half of the states are directly elected. Id at 213-15. "Most
appointed judges ... remain on the bench through what are called 'retention elections,'
where the incumbent is unopposed and voters simply determine whether the judge should
be kept in office." Id at 212.
s See note 128.
189 To expand on the point slightly, I suspect that sentences in states with advisory
guidelines correspond somewhat more closely to the judiciary's intrinsic sense of appropriate outcomes than is the case in the federal system. If so, there will inevitably be less
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years of purely advisory guidelines, the federal sentencing landscape would be an odd patchwork, with some judges and some
entire jurisdictions adhering reasonably closely to the Guidelines, while other judges and other jurisdictions according the
Guidelines only lip service or ignoring them altogether. Those
who loathe the current system might find a balkanized advisory
regime preferable inasmuch as it would give far more sentencing
power to judges and far more room for sentencing advocacy to
defendants and their counsel. Most neutral observers, however,
would see this outcome as a total abandonment of the goals of
the SRA.
In any event, it is clear to me from discussions with representatives of the Justice Department and members of Congress
that neither institution is likely to accept purely advisory guidelines as either a short or long term replacement for the current
system. Despite the fagade of complex rules, such a system would
confer on the judiciary a degree of sentencing discretion that neither Congress nor the executive is likely to find palatable.19 °
Hence, there is little or no chance that Congress would legislate
purely advisory guidelines, and if Booker is ultimately interpreted as rendering the Guidelines purely advisory, Congress
will surely legislate to change that outcome.
2.

Advisory guidelines 6. la Booker.

If, on the other hand, Bookes "effectively advisory" guidelines are really guidelines with strongly presumptive force, the
picture is much different, but no happier from the perspective of
meaningful federal sentencing reform. The problem is that judicial transformation of the old guidelines into advisorypresumptive guidelines leaves virtually all of the undesirable
features of the old system intact. The Guidelines would still be
too complex, would still provide multiple levers for prosecutorial
control of sentencing outcomes, and would still provide the same
incentives and mechanisms for congressional micromanagement,
thus ensuring the survival of the upward ratchet effect. The only
difference would be that judges would have some as-yettension between judges' desire to adhere to officially-sanctioned norms, on the one hand,
and the desire to do justice in the individual case, on the other.
'" See, for example, Testimony of Christopher A. Wray, Assistant Attorney General,
FederalSentencingAfter Booker, Before Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, Committee on the Judiciary, United States House of Representatives at 911 (Feb 10, 2005), available at <http//judiciary.house.gov/media/pdfs/Wray02lOO5.pdf>
(last visited Apr 7, 2005).
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undefined amount of additional discretion to vary from the
guideline sentence. While the exercise of this added discretion
might secure better outcomes for some defendants, it would also
inevitably create more inter-judge and inter-district disparity.
Over time, as Congress and the Justice Department continued to
nudge up the Guidelines sentences for crimes in the news, while
judges grow increasingly confident in their power to adjust sentences in individual cases, the gap between the sentences the law
declared to be presumptively correct and the sentences actually
imposed on real people would grow.
The prospect of some measure of added judicial discretion
seems to have mesmerized the judiciary, the defense bar, and a
good many commentators into believing that Bookerzs "effectively
advisory" guidelines might be nurtured into a viable, long-term
federal sentencing system. They may be right, but I doubt it. In
the end, the Booker regime teeters unsustainably between two
unpalatable outcomes. The more "advisory" the Guidelines become, the less they achieve the goals of the SRA and the more
likely it becomes that Congress will intervene to reassert control
over judicial discretion. The more "presumptive" the system becomes, the more it replicates the undesirable features of the existing federal guidelines.'9 1 In theory, the additional increment of
judicial discretion available under a presumptive-advisory system could help not only in individual cases, but with the larger
project of reforming the federal sentencing system, if Congress
and the Justice Department were prepared to treat judicial
variation from existing guideline rules as a form of valuable
feedback useful in crafting sentencing reforms. But the blockage
of that feedback loop is one of the primary reasons that the
Guidelines have evolved in the undesirable ways they have, and
there is no indication whatever that Congress or the Justice Department has experienced any change of heart on this question.
"Blakely-ization"

B.

Before Booker, many observers thought the Guidelines' anticipated invalidation could be addressed by keeping the Guidelines as a system of binding substantive sentencing rules, but
For an excellent discussion of the instability of the post-Booker sentencing regime,
see Testimony of Paul Rosenzweig, Sentencing in a Post-Booker World-It's Deja Vu All
Over Again, Hearing before the United States Sentencing Commission (Feb 15, 2005),
available at <http-/www.ussc.gov/hearings/02-15-05/Rosenzweig-testimony.PDF> (last
visited Apr 7, 2005).
191

149]

RECONFIGURINGFEDERAL SENTENCING

191

requiring that all facts triggering an upward offense level adjustment be found by a jury or admitted by the defendant as part
of his plea. In effect, all Guidelines rules whose application
would increase the maximum of a defendant's sentencing range,
probably excluding rules relating to calculation of criminal history, 192 would be treated as "elements" of a crime for purposes of
indictment, trial, and plea. This approach, which many members
of the defense bar advocated,'9 3 was the preferred remedy of Justices Stevens, Scalia, Souter, and Thomas, 94 and was referred to
as "Blakely-ization"of the Guidelines. The term "Blakely-ization"
has been used to refer to three rather different ideas.
1.

Biakely-ize the Guidelines as they are.

The first possibility is simply to leave the substantive sentencing rules of the current Guidelines untouched, but require
that all aggravating offense facts be resolved by trial or plea. If
the Booker remedial minority had its way, this result would have
been imposed by judicial fiat through a declaration that the
Guidelines' rules are severable from the procedure of postconviction judicial factfinding. In the wake of Booker, at least one
district court judge has proclaimed the authority to impose a requirement of jury findings on all aggravating sentencing guideline factors;'9 5 however, it seems somewhat unlikely that this
view will survive appellate scrutiny or that many judges would
adopt the approach even if it were legally possible to do so. Alternatively, Congress might respond to the Blakely and Booker
decisions by legislatively authorizing this outcome. While full
Blakely-ization of the Guidelines may still have adherents, the
consensus view is that the Guidelines as now written are simply
too complex and confusing to operate through juries.'96
192 The Court has previously held that sentence-enhancing facts relating to criminal

history need not be proven to a jury. See Aimendarez-Torres,523 US 224. However, it is
unclear whether Aimendarez-Torreswill ultimately survive Blakely.
193 See, for example, Testimony of David M. Porter, Assistant Federal Defender,
United States Sentencing Commission (Nov 16, 2004) ("Porter Senate Testimony"), available at <http'//www.ussc.gov/hearings/11 16_04/111604-panelthree.pdf> (last visited Apr
7, 2005) (endorsing the so-called "Kansas plan" for revising the federal guidelines).
'9
Booker, 125 S Ct at 779; id at 795 (Thomas dissenting).
195 United States v Barkely, Case No 04-CR-119-H (N D Okla 2005), available at
<http'//sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing-law-and-policy/files/cj.holmes-barkley-opini
on.pdf> (last visited Apr 7, 2005).
196 See Bowman, 41 Am Crim L Rev at 235-37 (cited in note 162). The ABA has
formed a task force to propose responses to Blakely. The non-Justice Department members of the task force concluded that, "It is unworkable to present the federal sentencing
guidelines in their present form to juries because they are unduly complex for that pur-
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Blakely-ize the Guidelines with modest changes.

Because of the general agreement that the Guidelines are
too complex to submit to juries as they stand, some have suggested making the Guidelines more jury-friendly by modifying
only the most complex and problematic aspects of the Guidelines,
such as the relevant conduct rules and the loss definition in economic crime cases. The idea is to simplify the Guidelines slightly
while leaving their structure fundamentally intact.'9 7 I have
some doubt that the current Guidelines could be simplified
enough to make them a desirable instrument in the jury setting.
But even if this were possible, Blakely-izing the current system
is still subject to at least three disqualifying objections.
First, treating all facts triggering Guidelines sentencing enhancement as elements of the offense would markedly alter the
plea bargaining environment. Negotiation between the parties
over sentencing facts would no longer be presumptively illegitimate "fact bargaining," but would become charge bargaining.
Because charge bargaining is the historical province of the executive branch, the government would be legally free to negotiate
every sentence-enhancing fact, effectively dictating whatever
sentence the government thought best within the broad limits
set by the interaction of the evidence and the Guidelines. The
government would no longer have any obligation to inform the
court of all the relevant sentencing facts and the only power the
court would have over the negotiated outcome would be the extraordinary, and extraordinarily rare, remedy of rejecting the
plea altogether. 9 8
A plea bargaining system that operated in this way might
benefit some defendants, such as those with particularly able
pose." ABA Blakely Task Force, Consensus ofNon-DOJMembers on Long-Term Solution,
12/8/2004 Draft (on file with author).
197 The Sentencing Commission reportedly began the process of drafting a simplified
set of Blakely-compliant guidelines before the Booker decision was handed down; by all
accounts, that project has been suspended, at least for now.
198 Even this remedy would be of little practical use. If the judge rejected a plea because she felt it was unduly punitive, she could not prevent the government from presenting its case to a jury. If a judge were to reject a plea on the ground that it did not adequately reflect the full extent of the defendant's culpability under Guidelines, the judge
could not force the government to "charge" the defendant with additional Guidelines
sentencing elements. The most the court could do is force the case to trial on whatever
combination of statutory and Guidelines elements the government was willing to
charge-a weak and self-defeating remedy because the two possible outcomes of a trial on
such charges are a guilty verdict on the charges the judge thought inadequate in the first
instance or a not guilty verdict on some or all of the charges, which would produce even
less punishment.
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counsel practicing in districts with particularly malleable prosecutors. On the other hand, making sentence factor-bargaining
legitimate would dramatically increase the leverage of prosecutors over individual defendants and the sentencing process as a
whole, leading to worse results for some individual defendants
and a systemic tilt in favor of prosecutorial power.
Even if one believes that Blakey-ized guidelines would confer a net bargaining advantage on defendants, any such benefit
would inevitably be uneven, varying widely from district to district and case to case. To the extent that the Guidelines have
made any gains in reducing unjustifiable disparity, a system in
which all sentencing factors can be freely negotiated would
surely destroy those gains. Prevention of this outcome was, after
all, the point of the Guidelines' "relevant conduct" rules.'9 9
It might be suggested that the Justice Department's own internal policies regarding charging and accepting pleas to only the
most serious readily provable offense would protect against disparity. However, the experience of the last decade, during which
variants of the same policy have always been in place, strongly
suggests that the Justice Department cannot meaningfully restrain local United States Attorney's Offices from adopting locally convenient plea bargaining practices. 00 Once previously
illegitimate "fact bargaining" becomes legally permissible charge
bargaining, no amount of haranguing from Washington will prevent progressively increasing local divergence from national
norms.
Second, if Guidelines enhancements were transformed into a
set of "elements" to be proven to a jury or negotiated by the parties, the effect would be to markedly reduce judicial control over
the entire federal sentencing process. Not only would district
court judges be stripped of the power to determine sentencing
facts and to apply the Guidelines to their findings, but appellate
courts would be stripped of any power of review. Neither jury
findings of fact nor the terms of a negotiated plea are subject to
appellate review in any but the rarest instances. Thus, Blakelyization of the Guidelines would have the perverse effect of exacerbating one of the central judicial complaints about the current
199 See USSG § 1B1.3 (2004); Wilkins and Steer, 41 SC L Rev 495 (cited in note 67).
20 A number of studies have found evidence of significant local variation in plea negotiation and other sentencing practices among different districts and circuits. See, for
example, Bowman and Heise, 87 Iowa L Rev at 531-34, 560 (cited in note 84) (noting
inter-district and inter-circuit disparities in average drug sentences and discussing the
"stubborn localism of judicial and prosecutorial behavior").
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federal sentencing system: the increase of prosecutorial control
over sentencing outcomes at the expense of the judiciary. A
Blakely-ized guidelines system would be a system of administrative justice in which private agreements between the executive
and defendants would determine sentences that courts would
merely rubber stamp.
Third, and in my view decisive, is the fact that a Blakelyized, but slightly simplified, version of the current guidelines
does nothing to address the dysfunctional character of rulemaking under the present regime. Without radical simplification of
the sentencing table and attendant rules, the new system, like
strongly presumptive advisory guidelines, would preserve all the
features that give Congress and the Justice Department incentive to intervene in the details of sentencing rulemaking. Moreover, a Blakely-ized version of the guidelines, even if slightly
simplified, would reduce the ability of the judiciary to influence
either sentencing rules or sentencing outcomes in individual
cases even further than was the case before Blakely and Booker.
3.

Radically simplify the Guidelines

Some have used the term "Blakely-ization" to refer to proposals to radically simplify the Guidelines, eliminating all but a
few of the current sentencing factors as legally binding considerations."' 1 In my view, this approach is the only one which holds
any promise; it will be discussed in detail in Part V below.
C.

Topless Guidelines

Shortly after the Blakely decision in June 2004, I proposed
an interim measure by which the Guidelines could be brought
into compliance with Blakely and preserved essentially unchanged by amending the sentencing ranges on the Chapter 5
Sentencing Table 212 to increase the top of each guideline range to
the statutory maximum of the offense(s) of conviction. Blakely
necessarily affects only cases in which post-conviction judicial
findings of fact mandate or authorize an increase in the maximum of the otherwise applicable sentencing range, while
20' James Felman, How Should CongressRespond If the Supreme CourtStr'kes Down
the FederalSentencing Guidelines, 17 Fed Sent Rptr 97 (2004); Jim Felman, Legislative
solutions to Blakely, Memo to the United States Sentencing Commission (Sept 16, 2004),
available at <http-//www.ussc.gov/hearings/11-1604/felman.pdf> (last visited Apr 7,

2005).
202

USSG § 5A (2004) (Sentencing Table).
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McMillan and Harrishold that a post-conviction judicial finding
of fact can raise the minimum sentence, so long as that minimum
is itself within the legislatively authorized statutory maximum.
Therefore, so long as facts found by judges applying the sentencing guidelines increase only the minimum sentence to be served
by a defendant, and not the maximum sentence to which he was
exposed, there would be no constitutional violation. In effect, the
"topless guidelines" approach would convert the Guidelines into a
system of permeable mandatory minimums. That is, the Guidelines would continue to function exactly in the way they always
have, except that the sentencing range produced by guidelines
calculations in any given case would have the same lower value
now specified by the Chapter Five sentencing table, while the
upper value would be set at the statutory maximum. Judges
would still be able to depart downward using the existing departure mechanism, but would not have to formally "depart" to impose a sentence higher than the top of the ranges now specified
in the sentencing table.
This proposal would require legislation because the expanded sentencing ranges produced by the proposal would fall
afoul of the so-called "25% rule," 28 USC § 994(b)(2), which mandates that the top of any guideline range be no more than six
months or 25% greater than its bottom. I have explained this
approach in more detail elsewhere, including refinements designed to provide protections against judges abusing the additional discretion the plan would afford for sentences at the high
end. 2 3 The Booker decision has changed the probable configuration of a "topless guidelines" proposal in at least one key respect.
It now appears that post-Booker guidelines would no longer
have to be entirely topless. Instead, the Guidelines could be
brought back into constitutional compliance by retaining the old
ranges and making the bottoms of the ranges mandatory but the
tops merely "advisory."
The advantages of "topless guidelines" as an interim solution
to the chaos created by Blakely were that they appeared to be
203 The proposal in its original form would have made any sentence above the guideline minimum appealable on an abuse of discretion standard. The fact that a judge imposed a sentence higher than that suggested by the policy statement for a typical case
would be a factor in the determination of whether the judge had abused his or her discretion. I also recommended that legislation creating "topless guidelines" sunset after eighteen months. See Frank 0. Bowman, III, Memorandum Presentinga ProposalforBringing
the FederalSentencing Guidelines into Conformity with Blakely v. Washington, 16 Fed
Sent Rptr 364 (2004); Bowman House Testimony (cited in note 183); Bowman Senate
Testimony (cited in note 183).
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constitutional and would have restored the federal criminal system to full function with minimal disruption. Aside from the risk
that some judges would abuse their high-end sentencing discretion, 0 4 the plan's disadvantages were, in the eyes of its critics,
almost identical to its advantages. It would restore the flawed
federal guidelines virtually intact and could easily be adopted as
a permanent solution, thus strangling any Blakely-spawned reform effort. 0"
D.

Guidelines Turned Upside Down

Because Blakely applies only to factors that raise sentences
and not to sentence mitigators, it would appear that one could
reconfigure the federal sentencing system by decreeing that all
defendants are presumptively subject to the maximum sentence
24 The evidence of judicial sentencing practice during the Guidelines era suggests
that few judges would impose greater sentences than they now do under a system in
which the top of the range was removed. See Bowman, 16 Fed Sent Rptr at 367 (cited in
note 203); Bowman House Testimony (cited in note 183); Bowman Senate Testimony
(cited in note 183).
205 For critiques of the proposal, see Testimony of Rachel Barkow, Blakely v. Washington and the Future of the FederalSentencing Guidelines, Hearing Before the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate (2004), available at
<http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfin?id=1260&witjid=3684> (last visited Apr 7,
2005); Weich, Senate Testimony (cited in note 183); Porter Senate Testimony (cited in
note 193). See also Douglas Berman, The 'Bowman Proposal": White Knight or Force of
Darkness Sentencing Law & Policy, available at <http'//sentencing.typepad.com/
sentencingjlaw-and-policy/2004/07/white knightor.html> (last visited Apr 7, 2005), and
other critiques posted or referenced on Professor Berman's invaluable blog, Sentencing
Law & Policy, available at <http:/www.sentencing.typepad.com> (last visited Apr 7,
2005).
I have never advocated "topless guidelines" as a permanent solution to the
BlakeljiBooker problem precisely because they would reinstitute a fatally flawed system.
And since the disruption that might have been avoided through rapid legislation in July
2004 has already happened, cannot be undone, and may be compounded by over-hasty
legislation, the time for passing topless guidelines as an interim measure has passed. For
a more complete explanation of the evolution of my position on "topless guidelines," see
Testimony of Frank 0. Bowman, III, A Counsel of Caution, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, Committee on the Judiciary, US
House of Representatives (Feb 10, 2005), available at <http'/judiciary.house.gov/media/
pdfs/Bowman021005.pdf> (last visited Apr 7, 2005).
The "topless guidelines" concept as a permanent replacement for the preBlakely4Booker guidelines has been the subject of favorable comments from the Justice
Department for some time, but DOJ has not yet supported any legislative response to
Blakely and Booker. See, for example, Testimony of Christopher A. Wray, Deputy Attorney General, The Future of FederalSentencing, United States Sentencing Commission
(Nov 17, 2004), available at <http'J/www.ussc.gov/hearings/11 16 04/Wray-testimony
.pdf> (last visited Apr 7, 2005); Testimony of Christopher A. Wray, Deputy Attorney General, Implications of the Booker/FanfanDecision for the FederalSentencing Guidelines,
Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism & Homeland Security, Committee on the Judiciary,
US House of Representatives (2005), available at <http'//judiciary.house.gov/media/pdfs/
Wray02lOO5.pdf> (last visited Apr 7, 2005).
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prescribed by statute absent proof of mitigating factors. Under
this plan, which was suggested by Justice Breyer as one theoretically possible method of constructing a sentencing system to
comply with Blakely,2 °6 the Guidelines would be rewritten to
work downward from the statutory maximum. This scheme
seems so counterintuitive that one can hardly believe that it
would be seriously contemplated. Among other peculiarities, it
would seem to require that the ordinary burdens of proof be reversed, with the government enjoying a presumption of the
statutory maximum sentence and the defendant assuming the
burden of proving facts reducing the sentence. As odd as it may
seem, it was for some time following Blakely the favored option
of important decisionmakers in the Justice Department and
among some key congressional staff. At present, it seems to be
receiving less attention.
E.

More Mandatory Minimums

If Congress decided not to reinstate the Guidelines regime
by removing the tops of the ranges, and was dissuaded from the
bizarre experiment of turning the Guidelines upside down, it
might well move toward a regime that relied far more heavily on
statutory mandatory minimum sentences. House Republicans
have already demonstrated their affinity for this approach with
the introduction of House Bill 1528, a bill that would transform
the Sentencing Guidelines into a complex system of mandatory
minimum sentences for all crimes and would also create a host of
new statutory mandatory minimum sentences for drug crimes.2 °7
Whether the facts triggering the minimums would be found by
judges or juries would depend on the ultimate fate of Harris,but
the determination of many in Congress to not relax their grip on
the sentencing practices of "soft" federal judges is patent.

206

124 S Ct at 2558.

207 Defending America's Most Vulnerable: Safe Access to Drug Treatment and Child

Protection Act of 2005, HR 1528, 109th Cong, 1st Sess (Apr 6, 2005). For analyses of the
provisions of this bill, see Letter from Frank 0. Bowman, III, to Cong. Howard Coble and
Cong. Robert Scott (Apr 11, 2005), available at <http'/sentencing.typepad.com/
sentencing_law-andpolicy/files/bowmanjudiciary-letter_41105_on bookerfix.doc> (last
visited May 26, 2005); Letter of United States Sentencing Commission to Congressman
Howard Coble and Congressman Robert Scott (Apr 19, 2005), available at
<http.//www.ussc.gov/HR1528.pdf> (last visited May 26, 2005); Letter of Criminal Law
Committee of United States Judicial Conference to Cong. James F. Sensenbrenner, Jr.
(Apr 25, 2005) (on file with author).
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V. A NEW PROPOSAL
There is a fourth respect in which Booker conjures up a
knuckleball-its effect on would-be reformers of the federal sentencing system. Whatever one's views of the merits of Justice
Scalia's Blakely opinion, it had two undoubted virtues-it sent
shock waves through a federal system badly in need of rethinking, and the rule it announced, even if asymmetrical and formalistic, was clear. After Blakely, but before Booker, it seemed obvious that some legislative response to the Court was going to be
required. Moreover, the possible legislative responses were reasonably clear-cut. By contrast, the manifold uncertainties of
Booker have, at least temporarily, paralyzed the movement for
broad federal sentencing reform. For the moment, most of the
major players are mesmerized by Booke?s uncertain flight, not
quite sure whether to swing away, bunt, or step out of the box.
This is a regrettable development. I have always thought
Blakely a bad decision: unsound as either an interpretation or
extrapolation of American Constitutional history; weakly reasoned and narrowly formalistic; heedless of its consequences to
both state and federal criminal justice practice; and stunningly
insensitive to considerations of institutional balance among the
branches and agencies of the federal government involved in the
sentencing process. "° On the other hand, I also believe that the
federal sentencing system has failed and requires a major overhaul. Thus, I viewed Blakely as an unfortunate incident from
which some good might come. If the opportunity for reform created by Blakelyis lost in the confusion surrounding Booker, if all
we gain is fractionally more judicial wiggle room under presumptive guidelines or the asymmetry of semi-topless guidelines, then
the whole Blakely/Booker incident will amount to nothing more
than aggravation and wasted opportunity. And if congressional
hardliners succeed in their effort to make Booker the catalyst for
a movement to pervasive mandatory minimum sentences, Booker
will have been an unparalleled disaster.
We can do better, or at least we ought to try. In place of the
proposals made to date, I suggest another alternative. The principal features of the proposal are these:

208 These views of Blakely are set out in detail in Bowman, 41 Am Crim L Rev 217
(cited in note 162); Frank 0. Bowman, III, Function Over Formalism:A ProvisionalTheozy of the ConstitutionalLaw ofCrime andPunishment,17 Fed Sent Rptr 1 (2004).
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A Simplified Sentencing Table

A.

As noted above, the current federal sentencing guidelines
system is essentially a set of instructions for the Sentencing Table.2" 9 The complexity of the Table contributed heavily to the proliferation of sentencing factors and the complexity that has had
such unfortunate effects at both the policy-making and operational levels. In addition, the complexity of the federal guidelines
is the feature that makes transformation of federal law to the
Blakely/Booker template most difficult. Moreover, whatever one
thinks of the rule Justice Scalia announced in Blakely, his basic
idea that juries should play a larger role in finding the facts that
delimit a defendant's punishment seems plainly right. As a practical matter, a system that gives juries a larger sentencing role
requires that the number of facts juries are asked to decide be
fairly small. Consequently, the constitutional reasoning of
Blakely and Booker and the preconditions for meaningful substantive reform converge in an imperative of greater systemic
simplicity.
A simpler federal sentencing system begins with a simpler
sentencing table. I propose a table incorporating the same two
indicia of punishment severity used in the current Sentencing
Table and common to virtually all modem guideline systemsoffense seriousness and criminal history. The table would have
nine basic levels of offense seriousness arrayed along the vertical
axis, and the same number of criminal history categories (six) as
the current guidelines arrayed along the horizontal axis.21 ° Each
intersection on the table would correspond to a "base sentencing
range" consisting of a maximum and minimum penalty. The contraction of the Sentencing Table to nine offense levels from the
current forty-three is accomplished by abandoning two features
of the current table: overlapping ranges and the logarithmic increase in maximum sentence-and thus in the width of rangesrequired by the "25 percent rule." The original Sentencing Commission created overlapping ranges largely to provide a disincentive for appeals; their theory was that litigants would be less apt
to appeal a sentence within the overlapping portion of two contiguous ranges because reversal of a judicial decision producing a
one-level difference would be deemed harmless error. In a postBlakely/Booker world, the factual determinations necessary to
209

See note 38 and accompanying text.

210 The Criminal History axis of the current guideline system might profitably be

modified and improved, but that effort is beyond the scope of this Article.
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place a defendant in a particular offense level will be made by
juries or as an incident of a plea, and thus will be effectively unappealable.2 '
As for the "25 percent rule," its undesirable effects on the
current Guidelines have not been limited to requiring the creation of an overly complex sentencing table. Widening each successive sentencing range by an additional 25 percent has a compounding effect such that the lowest ranges (those corresponding
to Offense Levels 1-13 and Criminal History Category I) are only
six months wide,2 12 but widen progressively until, at the highest
levels, the top of a range is more than seven years higher than its
bottom.2 1 These progressively widening sentencing ranges have
no justification in sentencing theory. They exist not because anyone believes that judicial discretion should be given greater play
as sentence lengths increase, but solely because the mathematical straitjacket imposed by the "25 percent rule" required logarithmically increasing ranges in order to cover the entire sweep
of possible sentence lengths from probation to thirty years in
prison. Worse still, ever-widening ranges mean that guidelines
sentencing factors that produce increases or decreases in offense
levels have no set value in terms of quantum of punishment.
For example, if a defendant commits a fraud against Smith,
a vulnerable victim, his sentence will be enhanced by two offense
levels.21 4 If he takes $12,000 from Smith, the two-level vulnerable
victim enhancement increases his minimum guideline sentence
by four months. On the other hand, if Smith's loss is $121,000,
the same two-level enhancement for exactly the same vulnerable
victim would increase the defendant's minimum sentence by six
months, and if the loss were $1.2 million, the same enhancement
would raise the minimum sentence by eleven months. 2 5 This effect is magnified for offenses such a white collar crime where the
Commission and Congress have added ever more targeted en-

211 Of course, a jury determination of a fact determinative of a defendant's offense
level could be appealed for insufficiency of the evidence in the same way that a defendant
can presently appeal a jury's finding of an element of the crime. But such appeals are
rarely successful. See, for example, Nguyen v United States, 539 US 69, 85 (2003) (noting
that appellant's challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction
were considered and rejected by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit).
212 USSG Ch 5, Pt A (1996).
213 Id (creating a sentencing range of 324-405 months for Offense Level 38, Criminal

History Category IV).
214 USSG § 3Al.1(b)(1) (2004).
215 USSG § 2B1.1 (2004).
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hancements.216 In such cases, a single defendant may be subject
to multiple and seemingly inconsequential two-level enhancements, but each enhancement will boost his sentence by an additional 25 percent. Like the compound interest charged weekly by
a loan shark, the total can mount rapidly to breathtaking levels.
In place of the current Sentencing Table's gradually widening ranges, the "base sentencing ranges" proposed here would be
of five types. First, the range expressed as "0-1" would correspond to Zone A on the current Sentencing Table217 and would
permit the imposition of a sentence of straight probation or any
combination of penalties up to one year in prison. Second, the
range expressed as "1-2" would correspond to Zones B and C on
the current Sentencing Table21s and would require the imposition
of some period of confinement up to two years, but would permit
split sentences and other alternative punishments. 2 9 Third, the
range expressed as "2-5" would require imposition of at least two,
but no more than five, years in prison. All ranges of 2-5 years or
greater would correspond to Zone D on the current Sentencing
Table in that at least the minimum guideline sentence would
have to be served in a prison. Fourth, the remaining numerical
ranges are five years wide. This figure was chosen for two reasons. First, it is a figure which permits the creation of ranges
that correspond nicely with many statutory minimum and
maximum sentences and thus simplifies the task of mapping the
statutory sentencing structure onto the new grid. 220 Equally important, because Blakely appears to bar upward departures
based on post-conviction judicial fact finding, the top of a jurydetermined range must be far enough above the bottom to permit
a sentencing judge to make meaningful distinctions between the
most and least serious offenders in each "base sentencing range"
See Bowman, 1 Ohio St J Crim L at 387-91 (cited in note 125) (discussing the rise
in white collar crime sentences during the past decade).
217 USSG §§ 5A,5C1.1(b) (2004).
218 USSG §§ 5A, 5C1.1(c) (2004).
219 A "split sentence" is one in which the court imposes a term of incarceration, some
portion of which must be served in prison and some portion of which may be satisfied by
lesser conditions of confinement such as home detention or community confinement.
USSG § 5Cl.1(d) (2004).
22 1 share the concern expressed by many observers about the deleterious effects of
mandatory minimums on federal sentencing practice. See, for example, Letter of Criminal
Law Committee of United States Judicial Conference to Congressman James Sensenbrenner (cited in note 207). Ideally, a new federal sentencing system would eliminate or
at least reduce the number and severity of such sentences. However, I think it exceedingly unlikely that this objective can be achieved in the near term. Accordingly, to be
politically viable, a new sentencing model probably has to accommodate existing mandatory minimums.
216
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without resorting to a constitutionally prohibited upward departure. Fifth, one "range" is reserved for the rare cases in which life
imprisonment is appropriate.
Figure 1 shows the basic table. I have not filled in values for
Criminal History Categories II-VI because calibrating the precise
effect of criminal history in this model is beyond the scope of the
present Article. In general, of course, sentences would increase
with increasing criminal history.
FIGURE 1: BASIC SENTENCING TABLE
(SENTENCES EXPRESSED IN YEARS)

I
1

0-1

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

1-2
2-5
5-10
10-15
15-20
20-25
25-30
LIFE

II

III

IV

LIFE

LIFE

LIFE

V

LIFE

VI

LIFE

On this sentencing table, the maximum sentence in each
"base sentencing range" would be the "statutory maximum sentence" as that term is defined in Blakely. Accordingly, as a constitutional matter, all facts necessary to assign one of the nine
offense levels and thus to a "base sentencing range," would have
to be pled and proven at a jury trial, at a bench trial if the defendant waives a jury, or admitted as part of a guilty plea.
Some pre-Blakely statutory crimes might be easily assignable to one of the nine offense levels based on proof of nothing
more than the traditional pre-Blakely elements of the crime.22 '
221 For example, federal homicide crimes could easily be placed into this system. Under current law, first degree murder has a base offense level of 43, USSG § 2A1.1(a)
(2004), or life imprisonment. USSG § 5A (2004). The new offense level would be 9, also
life imprisonment. Under current law, second degree murder carries a base offense level
of 33, USSG § 2A1.2(a) (2004), or 135-168 months (11 years, 3 months to 14 years), USSG
§ 5A (2004). The new offense level could be 5, or 10-15 years. Voluntary manslaughter is
now an offense level 25, USSG § 2A1.3(a) (2004), or 57-71 months (4 years, 9 months to 5
years, 11 months), USSG § 5A (2004). The new range could either be 3 or 4, and thus
either 2-5 years or 5-10 years. Reckless manslaughter is now an offense level 18, USSG §
2A1.4(a)(2) (2004), or 27-33 months, USSG § 5A (2004). The new range would be 3, or 2-5
years. Negligent manslaughter is now an offense level 12, USSG § 2A1.2(a) (2004), or 1016 months, USSG § 5A (2004). The new offense level would be 2, or 1-2 years. Note that

1491

RECONFIGURINGFEDERAL SENTENCING

203

For many classes of federal crime, however, offenses could not be
categorized without reference to at least some facts which have
hitherto been considered sentencing factors. This is particularly
true for several of the most commonly prosecuted categories of
federal crime, such as narcotics and fraud offenses, where the
statutes criminalize a broad swathe of behavior-running from
the trivial to the truly heinous-but create no rules for grading
crimes within the broad category.
Creating a simplified sentencing table would pose two immediate challenges: first, deciding which facts now classified by
the Guidelines as sentencing factors should be added to traditional statutory elements to create what amounts to a new system of offense classification; and second, deciding how to place
the hybrid element plus sentencing factor offenses on the simplified grid. Both phases would be moderately difficult, but hardly
impossible. For example, in narcotics cases, drug quantity is
written into the criminal code as a factor bearing on offense seriousness.222 Likewise, the law has for centuries treated the
amount of pecuniary loss imposed on victims as relevant to the
seriousness of property crimes."' The current drug and fraud
guidelines place drug quantity and loss amount at the core of
their calculations. A simplified system could transform drug
amount and loss into jury factors by simply reducing the number
of applicable subdivisions. The addition of one or two other factors, perhaps including role in the offense or particularly egregious victim impacts, should permit creation of a simple but rational classification system. The trickier part would be deciding
how to group element and non-element factors and determining
how much weight to give these factors in the grading scheme, but
the job would be a far simpler one than drafting the original
Guidelines.

in each case except first degree murder, the new range would be somewhat wider than
the old range, but would overlap most of the old range. The low end of the new range
would be slightly higher than the low end of the old in some cases (second degree murder
and negligent manslaughter), but would be slightly lower in others (reckless manslaughter and possibly voluntary manslaughter).
' See, for example, 21 USC § 841(b) (2004) (mandating five, ten, and twenty-year
minimum sentences for possession with intent to distribute various quantities of various
controlled substances).
23 See Frank 0. Bowman, III, Coping With 2Loss": A Re-Examination of Sentencing
FederalEconomic Crimes Under the Guidelines,51 Vand L Rev 461, 476-77 (1998) (describing the role of economic harm in the grading of economic offenses).
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Refining the Sentencing Calculus

So far, this proposal mirrors suggestions made by James
Felman, Chair of the ABA Sentencing and Corrections Committee, Professor Stephanos Bibas,22 4 and others, who have urged
that the Guidelines be reformed by shrinking the table, dramatically reducing the number of factors determinative of placement
on the table, and putting those factors to the jury. A reform that
went this far, but no further, would make the federal sentencing
system far simpler and constitutional under Blakely and Booker.
However, as helpful as these proposals have been, they require
significant refinement if their central insight is to become the
basis of a successful legislative program.
The theoretical problem with a barebones simplification approach is that it is too crude, being simultaneously too rigid and
too flexible. On the one hand, if a defendant's placement in a
relatively constrained sentencing range of 1-2, 2-5, or 5-10 years
is to be determined solely by conviction of the statutory offense
and jury determination of one or two additional sentencing factors, some critics will complain that the court ought to be able to
consider a wide variety of factors in selecting a range. Defendants (often) and judges (sometimes) will feel that the defendant's circumstances merit a sentence below the floor of the
range generated by the jury's findings. Prosecutors will want
mechanisms for inducing both pleas and cooperation through
sentence reductions.2 25
On the other hand, if the table were reduced to ten or fewer
offense level categories, the resulting ranges would be broad
enough that other critics would complain that judges would have
too much unrestrained discretion to choose a sentence within the
range. Without more, such a system sacrifices too many of the
goals and accomplishments of the SRA and the Guidelines. What
'4 Stephanos Bibas, Reforming the US. Sentencing Guidelinesafter Blakely, U Iowa
Legal Stud Research Paper No 04-01, available at <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid=634202> (last visited Apr 7, 2005) (arguing that the best longterm solution to Blakely is to simply and streamline the Guidelines while broadening
sentencing ranges, so as to allow more flexibility while retaining the Guidelines' binding
force); Felman, How Should Congress Respond, 17 Fed Sent Rptr at 97 (cited in note
201); Felman, Legislative Solutions to Blakely (cited in note 201) (arguing in favor of a
'codification' system in which certain culpability factors are added as elements of the
offense to be charged in the indictment and presented to the jury, whose verdict would
then yield a sentencing range that would be binding on the district court).
2 Jim Felman has recognized this point and suggests that downward departures
from simplified guideline ranges could be available in much the same way as they were
under the pre-Booker federal sentencing guidelines. Felman, Legislative Solutions to
Blakely (cited in note 201).
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is missing is some mechanism for moving below the sentencing
range set by the jury when necessary, as well as some method of
guiding judicial sentencing discretion within the range set by the

jury.
In addition, a barebones simplification approach suffers from
several political infirmities. The most important of these flaws
flows from the lack of constraint on judicial sentencing discretion
within the jury-determined ranges. It seems unlikely that either
Congress or the Justice Department would acquiesce to a plan
that gave federal judges unfettered discretion to sentence anywhere within five-year ranges. The SRA was intended to constrain judicial sentencing discretion and, as the Feeney Amendment to the PROTECT Act graphically demonstrate,2 2 6 the legislative determination to achieve that end has, if anything,
strengthened in recent years. In addition, a radically simplified
system that gives legal consequence to only a short list of factors
would require the Sentencing Commission to abandon all the
work it has done over the past two decades in identifying and
assigning values to increasingly intricate webs of sentencing factors. As an institution, the Commission may be amenable to
pruning back the foliage it has cultivated; it is unlikely to favor
plowing the garden under and sowing the ground with salt.
1. Constraining judicial sentencing discretion within the
ranges of a simplified system.
Two suggestions have been made for constraining judicial
discretion within the ranges of a simplified grid. First, Jim Felman suggests that the sentencing factors, that are listed in the
current Guidelines but not transformed into jury facts by the
new simplified system, should be treated by the sentencing judge
as non-binding considerations in setting the sentence within
221
While this suggestion is a reasonable one, it seems
range. 22
unlikely to meet the objections of the Justice Department or
Congress. For those institutions, "guidelines" without the force of
law are no guidelines at all, and an unstructured list of relevant
factors is unlikely to garner approval.
Second, in 2001, R. Barry Ruback and Jonathan Wroblewski
proposed a simplified sentencing table with eight-to-twelve offense levels. 22 They further suggested that each resulting sen226

See note 134 and accompanying text.

27 See Felman, Legislative Solutions to Blakely (cited in note 201).
21 See Ruback and Wroblewski, 7 Psych Pub Pol & L at 772-74 (cited in note 119).
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tencing range be subdivided into standard, aggravated, and mitigated sub-ranges.22 9 The sentencing judge would place the defendant in one of those three sub-ranges by determining which aggravating and mitigating factors enumerated in the Guidelines
were present in the case, and then find on the record whether the
existing aggravators, mitigators, or neither predominated. Assuming that the judge's findings of fact and balancing of factors
were subject to appellate review, a system of this sort would be
more structured and would constrain judges somewhat more
than the standardless consideration of guideline factors proposed
by Felman. Unfortunately, even if the additional degree of constraint would satisfy the interested political actors,23 ° Blakely
and Booker would seem to render the plan unconstitutional insofar as it conditioned a sentence in the upper or aggravated subrange upon a judicial finding of aggravating facts.
I propose a third alternative, which relies on the capability
to set minimum sentences based on post-conviction judicial findings of fact that endures under Harris. More colloquially, the
plan combines "topless guidelines" with a simplified sentencing
table. Under this plan, each "base sentencing range" in the simplified Sentencing Table starting with Level 3231 would be divided
into three sub-ranges. The bottom sub-range would span the full
"base sentencing range," from its minimum to its maximum. The
middle range would run from a minimum sentence somewhat
higher than the bottom of the full "base sentencing range" to the
top of the full range. The high sub-range would run from a
minimum sentence higher than the bottom of the middle subrange to the top of the full range.
Figure 2 shows the Basic Table with sub-ranges (but without
figures filled in for Criminal History Categories II-VI).

' Id at 771.
230 There is reason to doubt that Congress or the Justice Department would be satis-

fied with a system that assigned no values to aggravating or mitigating factors and created no rules for weighing those factors against each other. Both prosecutors and legislators would suspect (probably with justice) that the ostensible structure and rigor of the
three-tiered system would turn to mush in the press of everyday practice and would simply become a vehicle for erecting pro forma verbal justifications for each judge's subjective
outcome preferences.
231 The ranges in Levels 1 and 2 are probably too narrow to warrant subdividing them
into sub-ranges measured in months. One might, however, subdivide Level 2 in terms of
the types of alternative sentences that might be available.
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FIGURE 2: SENTENCING TABLE WITH SUB-RANGES
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Alternatively, one could take advantage of the nuances of
the Booker opinion by subdividing each base sentencing range
into thirds, and then making the low end of each sub-range mandatory in the same sense that the low ends of guideline ranges
were mandatory before Booker, while declaring the top end of the
bottom two sub-ranges "advisory." The effect would be much the
same.
This expanded table would be used as follows:
(1) The Sentencing Commission would review those
sentencing factors which are now included in the
Sentencing Guidelines and which it determines
should not become sentencing elements submitted to the jury. The Commission would (a) eliminate altogether some sentencing factors that are
infrequently used or, for other reasons, have not
demonstrated their usefulness to the sentencing
process; and (b) assign point values to the sentencing factors it elects to keep. Aggravating factors would be assigned positive point values,
while mitigating factors would be assigned negative point values.
(2) The Sentencing Commission would determine
how many points would be needed to trigger a
move from one sub-range to another sub-range.
The process would be similar to that now used to
place defendants in Criminal History Categories
along the horizontal axis of the current Sentencing Table.
(3) Conviction by plea or trial verdict would place a
defendant in the lowest (and broadest) of the
three sub-ranges of the basic sentencing range
corresponding to the intersection of the offense
level resulting from the conviction and the defendant's criminal history score.
(4) After trial, the court would receive a presentence
investigation report and conduct a sentencing
hearing much as it now does.
(5) At the hearing, the court would determine which
aggravating and mitigating factors existed in the
case. It would then add and subtract the point
values assigned to each factor found. It would
then determine the sub-range to which the defendant should be assigned. Finally, the court
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would select the defendant's sentence from
within that sub-range in the same way it selected a sentence within the guideline range preBooker,which is to say through the exercise of
largely unfettered discretion.
Such a system would operate quite differently than the existing guidelines in several important respects. First, the requirement that a number of offense level points must be accumulated to trigger a movement to the next higher sub-range would
de-emphasize the importance of non-element sentencing factors.
Under the current guidelines, every offense-related sentencing
factor is associated with an increase or decrease in a defendant's
offense level and thus with an increase or decrease in a defendant's maximum and minimum guideline sentence. Consequently, every judicial finding related to offense level necessarily
matters. In the proposed system, a judicial finding of an offenserelated sentencing factor would only have a necessary effect on
the defendant's sentencing range if the total points from all offense-related sentencing factors triggered a move from one subcategory to the next.
Second, the Blakely ruling means that the high end of the
"base sentencing range" to which the defendant is assigned by
virtue of trial or plea is the "statutory maximum sentence" and
thus is a hard cap on the defendant's possible sentence. Hence,
no matter how many offense level points a defendant was assigned during the post-conviction process of judicial fact-finding,
the court could not sentence the defendant to a term greater than
the top of the "base sentencing range." Non-element sentencing
factors would remain important because they could, in the aggregate, push the defendant up one or two sub-ranges and so increase a defendant's minimum sentence by as much as three
years. But they could not increase the defendant's maximum
sentence above the figure set by the jury's verdict or the defendant's plea.
The de-emphasis of non-element sentencing factors intrinsic
to the proposed system is critical because it addresses two principal critiques of the present guideline regime. First, at the case
level, Guidelines critics (including Justice Scalia and the other
members of the Blakely majority) have long been concerned that
judicial findings of relevant conduct can have a greater effect on
the defendant's ultimate sentence than the jury's verdict of guilt
of the crime itself-the concern manifested in the metaphor of
the tail which wags the dog. In his opinion for the Blakelymajority, Justice Scalia is scornful of the dissent's failure to place any
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meaningful constraint on the degree to which judicially-found
facts can impact a sentence. 23 2 The system proposed here would
continue to allow Congress and the Commission to enumerate
facts that, if found post-trial, would constrain the judge's discretion and affect the defendant's sentence. However, it would place
significant limits on the degree to which such facts could influence the sentence. The "dog" would be the "base sentencing
range" produced by the jury's verdict or the defendant's plea and
it would, under the table proposed here, be no more than five
years wide. No amount of relevant conduct tail-wagging could
increase the defendant's sentence above the top of that range. In
short, this proposal does "give intelligible content to the right of
jury trial,"2 33 while providing some structure to the exercise of
judicial sentencing discretion.
Second, placing a cap on the sentence-enhancing effect of
specific offense characteristics would have three salutary effects
at the rulemaking level. On one hand, it would reduce the political incentive for the Department of Justice and Congress to seek
ever more upward adjustments in response to outbreaks of public
concern about the crime du jour. There is less point in seeking
such adjustments if they will change the sentences of only some
of the defendants to whom they apply. On the other hand, to the
extent that Congress does mandate such adjustments, the proposed system would cabin their effect within the limits of the
"base sentencing range." Of course, the Justice Department could
seek and Congress could enact changes to the configurations of
statutory elements and sentencing factors associated with the
"base sentencing ranges," but this would be a sufficiently complex and systemically unsettling exercise that one suspects it
would not often be attempted.
The preceding two observations about the rule-making effects of the proposed system derive from the premise that constant intervention in the sentencing rulemaking process by Congress and the Department of Justice is a bad thing. I believe that
to be true as a general matter. Nonetheless, Congress certainly
has the right and the constitutional authority to make sentencing policy, and it will often feel political pressure to respond to
real or perceived crises by enacting new (usually tougher) sentencing measures. The Executive will sometimes feel similar
pressure. The system proposed here leaves room for the political
232

See Biakely, 124 S Ct at 2539.

233 Id at 2538.
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branches to do what they feel they must, while moderating the
real-world effects of such conduct. The proposed system makes it
fairly difficult for Congress to enact changes that have necessary
effects on lots of defendants and that disarrange the overall balance of the structure created by the Sentencing Commission. At
the same time, the system makes it fairly easy for the Justice
Department to seek and Congress to enact enhancements that
yield political benefit, but affect individual defendants only in
combination with other enhancements and only up to the ceiling
set by the base sentencing range.
2. Creating room for plea bargaining, cooperation incentives, and the exercise of judicial discretion.
The discussion in the preceding section focused on the effects
of aggravating adjustments and thus did not address three important issues: the necessity of sentencing incentives for guilty
pleas, the government's need for sentencing incentives to offer
potential cooperators, and the need for some degree of judicial
discretion to adjust the sentences of defendants whose crimes or
personal circumstances seem to require sentences less severe
than called for by the generally applicable rules. Satisfying these
needs requires a mechanism for reducing a defendant's sentence
below the floor of the "base sentencing range." Fortunately,
Blakely does not apply to sentencing facts that reduce sentences,
and thus the tools employed by the current Guidelines can be
readily adapted to the proposed system.
a) Plea bargaining,case management, and acceptance ofresponsibility.In 2002, 97.1 percent of all federal convictions were
obtained by plea.234 While that figure may be undesirably high,
few would argue with the proposition that the federal criminal
justice system will continue to depend heavily on plea bargaining, and thus that some incentive must be available to induce
defendants to plead guilty rather than exercising their trial
rights. At present, the principal incentive is the "acceptance of
responsibility" adjustment pursuant to § 3E.1, which offers a
two- or three-offense-level reduction for defendants who plead
235
guilty.
The proposed system could offer an analogous acceptance of
responsibility adjustment. It could be structured in one of several
234

United States Sentencing Commission, 2002 Sourcebook at 24, Table 11 (cited in

note 37).
25 USSG § 3E.1 (2004).
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ways. One possibility would be to award a certain number of offense level points for acceptance. These points would be subtracted from the points assessed for findings of aggravating sentencing factors, lowering the final point total used to place a defendant within the appropriate sub-range of the base sentencing
range. Acceptance of responsibility would have to be weighted
fairly heavily in offense level points to make it a sufficient plea
incentive. And even this might be insufficient if the only effect of
receiving the acceptance credit was to keep the defendant in the
lowest sub-range-where he would have a low minimum sentence but still be exposed to the maximum sentence in the range.
Accordingly, it might be necessary to create an acceptance of
responsibility credit that, if awarded, could move the defendant
down into the next lowest base sentencing range. This would not
only lower the defendant's minimum sentence, but would cap his
exposure at the top of the reduced base offense range, which
would correspond to the bottom of the original base sentencing
range.
b) Cooperationand substantialassistance.From the point of
view of prosecutors, one of the primary advantages of the existing sentencing guidelines over the previous regime of discretionary sentencing is the leverage created by the "substantial assistance" provisions of the SRA and the Guidelines.2 36 These provisions permit judges to depart downward from the otherwise applicable guideline range in consideration of a defendant's cooperation in the investigation or prosecution of others if, but only if,
the government moves for such a departure.2 37 This is not the
proper forum for discussion of the controversial government monopoly on substantial assistance motions,238 but regardless of
who has the power to seek cooperation reductions, it is fairly
plain that some inducement for cooperation would be required in
any revised federal guideline system. Not only is such an inducement desirable from a policy perspective, but it would cer236

See 18 USC § 3553(b) (2004); USSG § 5K1.1 (2004). See also Bowman, 29 Stetson L

Rev 7 (cited in note 76) (discussing various aspects of the debate over substantial assistance departures).
"3 See 18 USC § 3553(e) (2004) (authorizing departure below the statutory minimum
sentence upon motion of the government for "substantial assistance in the investigation
or prosecution of another person"); USSG § 5K1.1 (2004) (authorizing departure below the
otherwise applicable guideline range upon motion of the government for "substantial
assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person").
238 See American College of Trial Lawyers, Report and Proposalon Section 5K1.1 of
the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines (1999), available at <http://www.actl.com/PDFs/Report
ProposalSentencingGuidelines.pdf> (last visited Sept 18, 2005); Bowman, 27 Stetson L
Rev at 53-58 (cited in note 76).
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tainly be a precondition for Justice Department support of any
new system.
The system proposed here should include a downward departure provision closely patterned on the existing substantial
assistance rules. Downward departures for cooperation should be
permitted on motion of the government. Consideration should be
given to whether such departures would be limited to one base
sentencing range below the otherwise applicable range, or
whether, as is now the case, a substantial assistance motion
would empower a judge to reduce the sentence all the way to
probation, and in appropriate cases to go below a minimum
mandatory sentence.23 9
c) Judicialdeparture authority.The Blakely decision would
preclude what we would now call an "upward departure," that is,
a sentence above the top of the applicable sentencing range created by the facts found by the jury or admitted by plea. However,
Blakely does not preclude a downward departure below the bottom of a range determined by trial or plea. Accordingly, the proposed system can-and should-retain a provision for downward
departures initiated by judges, either with or without the approval of prosecutors. As with substantial assistance departures,
consideration should be given to whether any limit ought properly to be placed on the extent of the judicial departure power.
3.

Appeal.

In the proposed system, findings of fact by the jury would be
subject to appellate review only for sufficiency of the evidence
and would thus be overturned only in the rarest instances. However, post-conviction judicial findings of fact that affect placement in the sub-ranges would be subject to appeal in the same
way as sentencing factor determinations were under the preBooker Guidelines. Likewise, legal errors in applying sentencing
law to facts found by either juries or judges would be appealable
to the same extent as was the case pre-Booker.
C.

One Last Post-BookerWrinkle

The proposal outlined here depends at least in small part on
the rule of Harristhat post-conviction judicial findings of fact
239 At present, a judge may sentence a defendant below an otherwise applicable mandatory minimum sentence if requested by the government to do so in a substantial assistance motion.
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may generate legally binding minimum sentences. Booker may
cast at least some doubt on the continued viability of Harris.After Blakely, the conventional wisdom was that no judicially determined guideline range with even a presumptive maximum
could survive. But Booker, by salvaging the Guidelines, authorizes Guideline ranges with tops determined by post-conviction
judicial fact-finding. If the Court ultimately accords those ranges
at least some measure of legally presumptive effect, then the distinction between constitutional and unconstitutional guideline
systems becomes the degree of presumptiveness of the tops of the
guideline ranges. Put another way, the constitutional distinction
between a "statutory maximum" which must be determined by a
jury under Blakely and the top of a presumptive guideline range
that can be determined by a judge under Booker can only be the
degree of discretion afforded the judge to sentence above the top
of the range. If the Court decides that presumptive limits on
maximum sentences are constitutionally acceptable, it is hard to
see why the same reasoning should not apply to minimum sentences.
After Blakely, those who opposed the adoption of "topless
guidelines" raised doubts about the continued viability of Harris.
They noted that Justice Breyer was the fifth vote for preserving
statutes that set minimum sentences through post-conviction
judicial fact-finding, and that he expressed doubt about how
Harriscould be squared with Apprendi.Before Booker, it seemed
plausible that Justice Breyer and other members of the Court
who favor keeping the Constitution hospitable to structured sentencing systems would hold on to Har!is because it provided at
least one tool of structured sentencing. A system that constrains
judicial discretion only by setting minimums is awkward and
asymmetrical, but not wholly useless. After Booker, it is no
longer clear that the weird asymmetry of Blakely and Harrisis
necessary. It would make far greater sense for the Court to hold
that real, hard, impermeable statutory maximum and minimum
sentences can only result from facts found by juries or admitted
by plea, while at the same time permitting structured sentencing
systems that use judicial fact-finding to generate sentencing
ranges, presumptive at both top and bottom, inside the statutory
limits. Such an approach would appeal to many members of the
Court because it treats minimum and maximum sentences consistently, gives a meaningful role to juries in setting the actual
minimum sentences that matter more to defendants than theoretical maximums, preserves the accomplishments of the structured sentencing movement, and confers constitutional status on
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judicial sentencing discretion.2 4 ° If this is the direction the Court
is heading, then Harrisis in danger.
Would the fall of Harrisfatally wound the proposal in this
Article? I think not. The two central pillars of the proposal are
(1) using juries to determine the facts necessary to placement of
defendants within the base sentencing ranges of a drastically
simplified sentencing table, and (2) using judicial fact-finding to
further constrain the exercise of judicial sentencing discretion
within the boundaries of the base sentencing ranges. If my
analysis of where Justice Breyer is leading the Court should
prove correct, it would not affect the jury component of the proposal. A jury would still have to find (or a defendant would have
to admit) the facts that place a defendant in a base sentencing
range box. The only difference would be that the minimum sentence for subranges determined by post-conviction judicial factfinding would have only presumptive effect. This alteration
would not vitiate any of the major advantages of the proposal.
CONCLUSION

The system proposed here would offer a number of advantages. First, it remains a guidelines system that cabins judicial
sentencing discretion within ranges created by findings of fact,
some of which would be made by juries or result from the defendant's admissions during his plea, and some of which would be
made by judges after adjudication of guilt. Second, it retains a
significant role for post-conviction judicial findings of fact, while
at the same time giving juries a much larger role in setting limits
on a defendant's possible punishment. Third, it limits the effect
of "relevant conduct" on sentencing outcomes and thus addresses
the problem of the judicial sentencing tail wagging the jury trial
dog. Fourth, it is far simpler than the current federal sentencing
guidelines inasmuch as it markedly limits the number of decision
points required in each case to arrive at a final sentence. Fifth, in
consequence, the design markedly alters those structural features of the current guidelines that have made the rulemaking
process a one-way upward ratchet. The system proposed here is
not perfect. It is not even the best system that could be devised if
one were freed from considerations of practical politics and from
the architectural limits imposed by the Supreme Court's new
Sixth Amendment jurisprudence. It is, however, the best system
4 For a more complete outline of how this constitutional model of sentencing might

work, see Bowman, 17 Fed Sent Rptr 1 (cited in note 232).
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I have been able to come up with that meshes considerations of
sound national sentencing policy, the Court's new constitutional
rules, and pragmatic projections of what the major institutional
sentencing actors will and will not accept. I offer it not as a
panacea, but as a basis of discussion in the hope that the window
of opportunity created by Blakely and Booker will not be wasted.

